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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of these 
consolidated appeals pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(j) (1953), as amended, pertaining to final orders of 
any court of record over which the Utah Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The issues on appeal and applicable standards of review are: 
Issue 1: Whether an unambiguous and comprehensive written 
release of all claims, known and unknown, voluntarily and 
knowingly agreed to with assistance of counsel, is enforceable as 
a matter of law to bar all claims for Defendants' prior conduct. 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a contract and 
its application to the parties, as determined by the words of the 
agreement, is a question of law. 50 W. Broadway Assoc, v. The 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 
1989). The trial court's legal determinations are allowed no 
deference and are reviewed for correctness. Eskelson v. Town of 
Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 771 (Utah 1991); Frontier Foundations v. 
Layton Construction, 818 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah App. 1991) 
Issue 2: Whether the failure of Defendants, during 
partnership buyout negotiations, to disclose prior conduct which 
the Plaintiffs now claim was fraudulent, voids the specific 
release of both "known and unknown" claims. 
-1-
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Standard of Review; The issue of whether a release 
agreement that releases all possible claims is void because of a < 
claimed failure to disclose prior conduct is an interpretation of 
law. This Court will not defer to the trial court's 
interpretation of the release or to the application of the law to I 
the facts of this case. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585-6, 589 (Utah 1991). 
Issue 3; Whether Plaintiffs were entitled to refer to or < 
submit evidence regarding Defendants1 financial condition during 
the jury trial before any finding was made that Defendants were 
liable, in total disregard of Defendants1 right to a fair trial ' 
and Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(2) (Supp. 1992). 
Standard of Review: This Court will review the trial 
court's refusal to apply §78-18-1(2) as a "correction of error," ' 
disregarding the trial court's interpretation of the statute. 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). Also, no 
deference is accorded the trial court's determinations regarding 
the admissibility of evidence. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-2, n.3 (Utah 1991) . 
Issue 4: Whether the award of $1.8 million in punitive 
damages is excessive and/or influenced by passion or prejudice. 
Standard of Review: Under Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (1991), the trial judges' responsibility 
is to review the punitive damage award and its amount, and to 
insure that the jury has acted within its proper bounds. This 
Court will reverse the trial court's refusal to grant Defendants' 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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motion under Rule 59(a), U.R.Civ.P., only for an abuse of 
discretion. 817 P.2d at 805-6. The trial court has abused or 
"exceeded" its "discretion" when its finding is "clearly 
erroneous," or it acts "unreasonably" or misapplies the law. 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 
1991); Cf^ Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805, n.20. 
Issue 5: a. Were Defendants denied a fair trial because 
of the cumulative effect of the numerous erroneous evidentiary 
and other rulings, and the prejudicial comments by the trial 
court? 
b. Were the jury's findings a result of its bias, 
prejudice, and/or confusion indicating a lack of understanding as 
to what it was supposed to do, necessitating a new trial? 
Standard of Review: Whether Defendants were denied a fair 
trial is an issue of law. Whether the jury's verdict is a result 
of passion, prejudice and/or confusion is an issue of law and the 
appellate court will give no deference to the trial court and 
will review its rulings for correctness. Eskelson v. Town of 
Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 771 (Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27-8 (Utah App. 1991). 
Issue 6: Were Plaintiffs entitled, under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 
to an award of costs that included the cost of every deposition 
of every person deposed during discovery and witness fees in 
excess of the statutory rate? 
Standard of Review; The appellate court will review the 
trial court's cost award under Rule 54(b) for "abuse of 
-3-
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discretion." Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-4 (Utah 
1980); Nielson v. Nielson, 818 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah App, 1991). 
An award outside the limits and bounds set by this Court and the 
rule will be reviewed under a correction of error standard. No 
deference is accorded the trial court's legal determination. 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27-8 (Utah App. 
1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(2) is determinative of Appellantfs 
argument, Point IIB herein on punitive damages. The statute is 
attached as Addendum ML" to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants refer herein to the Record on appeal as follows: 
References to the Court's file and to the transcript of 
proceedings include the volume and the page number as 
paginated by the clerk for this appeal 
Pleadings and District Court File as "R. [Vol.]:[Page]" 
Transcript of Proceedings as "Tr. [Vol.]:[Page]" 
Trial Exhibits as "Exh. [#]" 
Addendum attached to brief as "Add. [#]" 
The "Appendix" is a separately bound volume containing 
various trial exhibits. Exhibits reproduced in the Appendix 
are also designated with "App." 
The Complaint was filed on July 26, 1990. (R. 1:2-18) It 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
alleged claims for fraud, constructive fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation based primarily on alleged misrepresentations 
as to the composition of individual crypts in the outdoor garden 
pavilions of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum. The Complaint 
sought rescission of a Partnership Agreement and a later 
Redemption Agreement by which Defendants1 interest in the 
partnership was acquired by Plaintiffs. Alternatively, 
Plaintiffs sought damages of $2.5 million. The Complaint also 
alleged that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by their 
alleged misrepresentations and by failing to disclose material 
facts concerning the outdoor garden crypts. The Complaint also 
alleged that Defendants had wrongfully converted several crypts. 
There was no claim that the financial condition or history of any 
mausoleum property was misrepresented. (Tr. 111:3221-22) 
Defendants answered, denying all allegations of wrongdoing. 
(R. 1:34-46) Among other affirmative defenses, Defendants 
alleged that the release provisions of the Redemption Agreement 
(Exh. 31 - App.) barred all the claims of the Complaint. 
After considerable discovery, Defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment based on Plaintiffs1 release of all their claims 
against Defendants under the terms of the Redemption Agreement. 
(R. 1:267-369) The trial court denied the motion on the ground 
that "there are sufficient issues of fact bearing upon the 
conduct of the parties incident to the execution of the 
dissolution and release agreement [the Redemption Agreement, 
Exh. 31] . . ." (Tr. Apr. 8, 1991:2859) 
-5-
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The case was tried to a jury in a 10-day trial in August 
1991. The parties called 26 witnesses, creating almost 2,000 < 
pages of trial transcript. Over 100 exhibits were received at 
trial. (R. 5:1770-91) On Monday morning, August 26, 1991, the 
jury returned a verdict after only 2-1/2 hours of total < 
deliberations. (R. 4:1414-15) The special verdict form 
contained 14 questions to be answered by the jurors, including 
the amount of any compensation to which Plaintiffs might be < 
entitled under their rescission theory, as well as actual damages 
under their alternative claim for damages. (R. 5:1872-76 -
Add. "F") The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims ' 
of fraud and negligent misrepresentations, but found no 
constructive fraud. 
The jury found the damages under Plaintiffs' fraud theory to 
be $447,034.00. The jury also found that Plaintiffs were 
entitled under their rescission theory to "consequential damages" 
of $1,165,022.00 in addition to the $1,240,220.00 Plaintiffs had 
invested initially in the partnership and under the Redemption 
Agreement. The jury also assessed punitive damages of $1.8 
million against Defendants. 
The jury further found that Plaintiffs were entitled to 
$70,000.00 for breach of Defendants1 fiduciary duties and an 
additional $512,098.00 for Defendant Garner's conversion of 
assets. (R. 5:1872-76; Tr. XI:4826-37) 
The trial court entered its Judgment on September 26, 1991, 
incorporating therein the entire special verdict of the jury. 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Judgment rescinded the Partnership and the Redemption 
Agreements for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and awarded 
Plaintiffs $2,405,242.00 in restitution and $1.8 million in 
punitive damages. (R. 5:1923-36 - Add. MFM) 
Defendants1 timely motions for judgment N.O.V. or for new 
trial, and for remittitur of punitive damages, were denied by the 
trial court on November 13, 1991. (R. 5:1920-22; 6:2532-38 -
Add. "G") 
On October 8, 1991, on Plaintiffs1 motion, the court entered 
a supplemental judgment against Defendants in the amount of 
$29,648.00 for Plaintiffs' interim operating costs between the 
time of trial and the date of judgment. (R. 6:2165-67 - Add. 
"H") 
Defendants filed their notice of appeal on November 14, 
1991, appealing from both judgments. (R. 7:2690-92) An amended 
notice of appeal was filed December 4, 1991, merely correcting 
the date of the supplemental judgment. (R. 7:2810-12) 
Meanwhile, following a hearing before this Court on 
November 20, 1991, the parties worked out a stipulation for an 
interim and permanent supersedeas bond pending appeal. 
(R. 7:2758-2809) 
Plaintiffs filed a verified memorandum of costs on 
October 3, 1991. (R. 5:2073-84 - Add. "I") Defendants objected 
and moved to tax costs. (R. 6:2265-2302 - Add. "J") The trial 
court taxed costs by a Minute Entry ruling on December 23, 1991. 
(R. 7:2854) A judgment for costs was entered January 2, 1992, 
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awarding Plaintiffs $11,503.60 for deposition fees, witness fees 
of $631.75, and the filing fee of $125.00, a total of $12,260.35. 
(R. 7:6495-96 - Add. "K") 
Defendants appealed from that judgment on January 24, 1992. 
(R. 7:6511-12) That appeal was docketed in this Court as Appeal . 
No. 920066. (R. 7:6524) Thereafter, this Court consolidated the 
various appeals taken by Defendants in this case under Appellate 
Case No. 910522. , 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Plaintiffs 
Plaintiff David L. Alldredge graduated from Brigham Young 
University in 1969 in Asian Studies and Political Science and 
then obtained an M.B.A. at Harvard University in 1971. 
(Tr. 1:2935-36) Alldredge then spent over 14 years as a 
commercial banking officer with the First National Bank of 
Chicago developing business for the bank. (Tr. 1:2936-37) 
Alldredge was General Manager of the bank's Singapore Branch, 
residing there. He was later promoted to be the bank's area head 
for North Asia and resided in Hong Kong. (Tr. 1:2938) 
One of the routine responsibilities Alldredge had was to 
bring potential investments to the attention of his clients, and 
the Ong family was one of his best clients. (Tr. I:2943A; 
11:2974) At one time, he had authority to authorize bank loans 
as high as $20 million. (Tr. 11:3119) 
In 1985, Alldredge joined the International Bank of Asia in 
Hong Kong and was appointed its General Manager for the Hong Kong 
area. He directly supervised about 40 employees in the business 
development division, but was also responsible for all 700 bank 
employees in his area. (Tr. 1:2938-9) 
Plaintiff D & D Management is a Utah corporation organized 
and owned entirely by Alldredge individually. (Tr. 111:3237) 
Mr. Ong Ka Thai was raised in Singapore. He received a 
college education in California, graduating from UCLA in 1974. 
(Tr. V:3796-7) Mr. Ong described his professional occupation as 
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"businessman and a company director." (Tr. V:3797) Mr. Ong is 
the Executive Director of Ong Holding Co., which is a publicly- I 
held investment company based in Hong Kong and listed on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. (Tr. V:3798-99) Mr. Ong became acquainted 
with Plaintiff Alldredge in the late 1970's when Alldredge was a < 
banker for the various Ong family businesses and Mr. Ong worked 
in "financial services" for his family company in Singapore and 
Jakarta. (Tr. V:3799-800) < 
Plaintiff Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc., a Nevada 
corporation, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Ong Holding 
Company and was formed in 1987 to invest in United States' ( 
business. Both Mr. Ong and Mr. Alldredge have served as the 
President of Ong International and Mr. Ong is now its Chairman of 
the Board. (Tr. VI:3880-81; V-.3798) ' 
B. The Defendants 
Defendant Keith E. Garner is a Utah resident who has 
developed commercial, residential and industrial properties since 
1956. (Tr. V:3644-47) He is the principal shareholder of 
Defendant 11th Avenue Corporation, a Utah corporation. (Tr. 
V:3645; Tr. 111:3235) 11th Avenue Corporation owned the Salt 
Lake Memorial Mausoleum located on the Salt Lake City north bench 
above the City cemetery. (R: 1:0003-4; Exh. 1) Garner purchased 
his stock in the corporation in about 1979. (Tr. V:3649) 11th 
Avenue Corporation was originally known as "Salt Lake Memorial 
Mausoleum," but changed its name to "SLMM" when the parties 
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formed their partnership herein, (Tr. V:3645; 11:3016; 
R. 1:0003) The corporation again changed its name to 11th Avenue 
Corporation after the 1989 Redemption Agreement by which 
Plaintiffs acquired total ownership of the partnership, which 
then owned the Mausoleum. (Tr. IX:4582; R. 1:0003; Exh. 31) 
Defendant Garner supervised and controlled the operation of 
the Mausoleum facility from 1979 until the partnership in 1988, 
when David Alldredge came to Salt Lake to manage the facility in 
July. (Tr. V:3649-51) 
C. The Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum 
The Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum ("Mausoleum") is in the 
business of providing facilities for the above ground interment 
of the dead. (Exhs. 12, 13, 16 - App.) The Mausoleum consists 
of a large main building of indoor burial compartments called 
crypts, five outdoor garden pavilions to the east (Exhs. 6-8, 110 
- App.), and a smaller office building to the west. The property 
also includes four building lots known as the Skyway Heights 
lots. (Exh. 1 - App.) 
The indoor, or main, mausoleum building was constructed in 
the late 1920's. The crypts therein were constructed of 
concrete, with pipes providing ventilation to the outside. 
(Tr. 1:2958-59; 11:2997) Construction of the main mausoleum and 
its crypts is not at issue. 
From 1984 through 1987, Defendants constructed five outdoor 
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garden pavilions adjoining each other. (Exh. 51 - App.)1 As 
shown in the pavilion footprint, each outdoor pavilion structure , 
contains 102 crypts. (Exh. 110 - App.) 
At the entrance to each outdoor pavilion is a wrought iron 
gate in the south side, which opens to an inner patio flanked on < 
the remaining three sides by the crypts. Each crypt is faced 
with marble. (See Exhs. 7, 8 - App.) The outer walls, ceiling 
and floor of each pavilion are of reinforced concrete, and each I 
pavilion is roofed with Bartile shingles. (Exhs. 253 - App.) 
The roof overhangs the entrance and sides of each pavilion by 
several feet. (Exh. 6 - App.) Plaintiffs did not dispute the i 
structural integrity and adequacy of the pavilion shell 
structures at trial. (Tr. VII:4271) 
The interlocking crypt compartments in the three center < 
pavilions (see Exh. 110) are constructed of wood, except where 
they abut the outer concrete walls of the pavilion and where the 
marble facings appear. (This method of construction is ' 
illustrated in Exhs. 255, 259, 11, 16 - App.) The crypts of the 
other two remaining pavilions are made of a combination of wood 
and concrete or all concrete. (Exhs. 12, 13 - App.) 
These garden pavilion crypts are vented by holes beginning 
in the ceiling of the lowest crypt, to the floor of the one above 
and on into the attic above each bank of crypts. (Exh. 19 -
App.) Ventilation is provided from the attic to the outside. The 
1
 Photograph exhibits and architectural drawings of the 
pavilion shells (Exhs. 1, 6-8, 11, 49-50) are all contained in 
the separate Appendix. 
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outdoor crypts do not have a drainage system to handle any fluid 
drainage that might occur from a body in a casket. (Tr. IV:3472) 
However/ Plaintiffs' expert said there might be fluid drainage 
only once in every several hundred entombments. (Tr. IV:3618) 
When a body is entombed, the marble facing of the crypt is 
removed and the burial casket is inserted into the crypt space. 
For higher crypts, the casket is first lifted onto scaffolding at 
the appropriate level to facilitate the entombment. (Exh. 260 -
App.) The open front of the crypt is then sealed with a thick 
plate of plexiglass and the marble facing is placed back on. 
(Exh. 21 - App.) 
The outer concrete shells of the pavilions were constructed 
in 1984 and 1985. The crypt compartments were built during late 
1985 and early 1986. (Exh. 51 - App.; Tr. VIII:4445) In the 
fall of 1986, marble facings were placed over the openings of a 
majority of the outdoor garden pavilion crypts, but 12 to 18 
crypts in each pavilion remained open and unfaced until October 
of 1987. (Tr. VIII:4445-46; Exh. 11 - App.) During these two 
years, each open crypt was exposed to public view. The wooden 
framework construction was readily apparent to anyone in the near 
vicinity, even from as far away as the roadway of 11th Avenue. 
(Tr. VIII:4387, 4454-56; Exh. 11 - App.) 
D. Acquaintance of the Parties 
Defendant Garner and Plaintiff Alldredge first became 
acquainted in 1965 in Hong Kong, where Plaintiff Alldredge was an 
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L.D.S. missionary when Mr. Garner arrived as the new president of 
that mission. (Tr. 1:2928-30) Plaintiff Alldredge left Hong 
Kong in 1965, and the two had no further communication or 
association until 20 years later, in November 1986, when they met 
by chance at a B.Y.U. football game in Provo, Utah. (Tr. 1:2935, 
2940) Mr. Alldredge was then living in Hong Kong, where he was 
the Manager of the Asian Bank. (Tr. 1:2938, 2943A) 
That encounter led to discussions between Defendant Garner 
and Plaintiff Alldredge concerning possible joint ventures 
between Mr. Garner and Mr. Alldredge's client, Mr. Ong, or 
entities with which they were associated. (Tr. 1:2940, 2943, 
2947, 2952; V:3803) 
E. Inspections of the Mausoleum 
In April 1987, while in Salt Lake City negotiating another 
joint venture, Alldredge and Ong received a tour of the Mausoleum 
from Mr. Garner. (Tr. VIII:4321-2, V:3675, 1:2954) Garner 
showed Alldredge and Ong the indoor mausoleum building, including 
a "model" crypt therein faced with a glass front and made of 
concrete. (Tr. 1:2958-59) Unlike all the other crypts, however, 
that indoor "model" crypt is lighted inside and is plastered and 
painted. (Tr. VIII:4328-29, V:3676, VIII:4364) Alldredge 
claimed that when he was shown this "model" crypt he was told 
that it was "representative" of all of the crypts throughout the 
mausoleum property. (Tr. 11:2971) 
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Alldredge testified that they then walked outside and were 
shown the outdoor pavilions from the sidewalk that runs in front 
of them, but that he was close to the curb of the driveway and 
does not recall just how far down the sidewalk he went. 
(Tr. 11:3142) Alldredge testified that Garner told them that the 
outdoor crypts in the pavilions were built to the same "high 
quality" as the indoor mausoleum. (Tr. 11:2971) 
Mr. Alldredge's testimony was not corroborated by Mr. Ong, 
who did not recall visiting the Mausoleum on that occasion. 
(Tr. V:3805-06) 
In his testimony, Mr. Garner described how he took both 
Mr. Ong and Mr. Alldredge around the Mausoleum in April 1987. 
They visited the indoor mausoleum and Mr. Garner testified that 
he showed them the "model" crypt to illustrate just what a crypt 
is. (Tr. VIII:4322) 
Exiting the main building, Ong and Alldredge then walked 
outside to the front of the five outdoor pavilions. Mr. Garner 
testified that he told them that he had designed the outer shell 
of the pavilions with reinforced concrete and steel so as to make 
it appropriate to use wood inside for the crypts and that the 
first outdoor crypts were built of concrete but the rest were of 
wood or concrete and wood. (Tr. VIII:4323-4) 
Mr. Garner further testified that in July 1987, he again 
took Mr. Alldredge on a tour of the Mausoleum. (Tr. VIII:4325, 
4327-31) After lunch that day with Dr. Burtis Evans, Garner's 
friend, the three returned to the Mausoleum where they again 
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viewed the outdoor pavilions. (Tr. VIII:4333-34) Dr. Evans 
testified that they saw the interior of the crypts with 2x4's and -
plywood visible where marble facing had not yet been installed. 
(Tr. IX:4653-55) Alldredge specifically commented "that the wood 
proposition in the crypts was an interesting innovation." ^ 
(Tr. IX:4652f 4655, 4680) Dr. Evans also recalled that Alldredge 
called Mr. Garner an "innovator" for his design of the pavilions. 
(Tr. IX:4655, 4680) < 
Susan Stewart, 11th Avenue's Corporate Secretary, was 
present in Mr. Garner's office in July 1987 when Mr. Garner 
showed Mr. Alldredge a model of the outdoor pavilions and told ( 
him about the properties of the wood used. (Tr. IX:4592, 4639) 
Mr. Alldredge admitted that he may have visited Mr. Garner 
in his mausoleum office in July of 1987, but claimed that he did < 
not see any other areas of the premises. (Tr. 11:2983, 3153-56) 
He also testified that it was "possible" he visited with 
Dr. Burtis Evans at the Mausoleum, but he could not recall it. ( 
Alldredge did recall a lunch with Dr. Evans and Mr. Garner, but 
claimed that was in 1988. (Tr. 11:3157-59) 
Until October of 1987, 84 of the outdoor crypts had no 
marble facing covering their front and they were open to public 
view. Forty-eight of those eighty-four crypts (18 in each of the 
3 middle pavilions), were made entirely of wood. (Tr. VIII:4446; 
IX:4595) 
Mr. Alldredge claimed that the parties did not discuss 
Plaintiffs investing in the mausoleum property until November 
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1987. (Tr. 11:2984) However, he also testified that from that 
time forward all financial and other information about the 
Mausoleum which Plaintiffs requested from Defendants was 
provided. (Tr. 11:3187; 111:3215, 3224) Such information 
included the number of outdoor crypts that had been sold; the 
number of burial spaces, both indoor and outdoor, available for 
sale; and the fact that there had been a financial loss from 
operation of several hundred thousand dollars for several years 
preceding the negotiations. (Tr. 11:3168) 
Unknown to Defendants, Alldredge prepared a financial 
analysis of the Mausoleum and also commissioned an independent 
survey and analysis of the business, and furnished both to the 
Ong family for its review. (Tr. 11:3006; Exh. 139, 140 - App.) 
Mr. Alldredge testified that he met with Mr. Garner at the 
Mausoleum in December 1987 and received Ma much more detailed 
tour." (Tr. 11:2993) He stated that Mr. Garner gave more detail 
on the construction of the indoor mausoleum and pointed out a 
valve in the model crypt used for ventilation and drainage. (Tr. 
11:2996) Mr. Alldredge claims that Mr. Garner told him that all 
of the crypts on the mausoleum property were concrete, 
waterproof, and fireproof. (Tr. 11:2997-98) 
Mr. Garner denied that he gave such a "tour" of the 
Mausoleum to Mr. Alldredge in December 1987, but agreed that he 
did talk with Alldredge about the Mausoleum. (Tr. VIII:4339) 
Susan Stewart testified that in December 1987 she overheard 
Alldredge and Garner in Garner's office discuss Mausoleum 
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finances, but never heard any discussion regarding crypt 
construction. (Tr. IX:4597-8) 
During the first week of April 1988, Alldredge and Ong, with 
Mrs. Ong, received a tour of the mausoleum property with Mr. 
Garner. Mr. Alldredge claimed that Mr. Garner then made the ^ 
"same" representations concerning the construction of the outdoor 
crypts that had been made to Alldredge previously. (Tr. 11:3024; 
111:3325)
 ( 
Mr. Garner recalled having "toured" the mausoleum property 
with Mr. Alldredge and Mr. and Mrs. Ong in April 1988, but said 
that he did not discuss with them the construction of the outdoor ( 
crypts or the materials used therein in April 1988 when they 
visited the property. (Tr. VIII:4340-41; V:3675) Mrs. Ong did 
not testify. < 
F. The Partnership 
Mr. Garner visited the Plaintiffs in Hong Kong in March { 
1988. There, the parties reached a preliminary agreement for Ong 
to acquire a 50% stock interest in the Mausoleum, including the 
outdoor garden pavilions and other adjoining premises. (Tr. 
11:3104; 111:3229; VI:3875-76; Exh. Ill) 
The parties finally agreed to a partnership and executed a 
Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988. (Exh. 28 - App.) 
Plaintiffs Ong International, D&D Management, and Salt Lake 
Memorial Mausoleum (the corporation, now 11th Avenue Corporation) 
became the partners. The mausoleum corporation, contributed the 
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property and business. Plaintiff Ong International contributed 
$800,000.00. Alldredge received a 12% interest, even though he 
contributed nothing but his experience. (Tr. VI:3878-9; 11:3014; 
111:3232) 
Plaintiff Alldredge returned to Utah from Asia in June 1988 
as the manager of the Mausoleum and took an office in the indoor 
mausoleum building in July 1988. (Tr. 11:3032; 111:3247-48) 
Once in the fall of 1988, Plaintiff Alldredge assisted, at 
the request of Defendants, in entombing a casket in a wood crypt 
in an outdoor pavilion. Specifically, Mr. Alldredge helped lift 
the casket onto scaffolding in front of the crypt which was open 
to his view. Alldredge admitted that no one prevented him from 
seeing the crypt, but claimed that he did not see or even look at 
the crypt at that time. (Tr. VIII:4344-46; 111:3287-92) 
Soon after Mr. Alldredge began officing at the Mausoleum in 
July 1988, various disputes arose between the parties. 
(Tr. 11:3035-41; 111:3252-55; VIII:4470) Alldredge claimed that 
Garner refused to relinquish control and management of the 
business. (Tr. 11:3035) 
The friction between Alldredge and Garner over their 
relationship increased until, by November of 1988, Plaintiffs 
"had lost all trust" in Defendant Garner. (Tr. 111:3252-54; 
VI:3880; V:3826) 
During the time that 11th Avenue was in partnership with 
Plaintiffs, from May 1988 through February 1989, Mr. Garner did 
not make any statement to Mr. Alldredge or to Mr. Ong concerning 
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the construction, design, or composition of the crypts in the 
outdoor pavilions. (Tr. 11:3050-51; 111:3276) 
G. The Redemption Agreement and Release 
Because Plaintiffs had "lost all trust" in Garner, the 
parties discussed and finally agreed to terminate their 
relationship as partners. (Tr. 11:3049; 111:3271-73, 3276-79) 
In their final negotiations, Ong's interests were represented by 
their attorney, Edward Djang of California. (Tr. V:3839) 
Defendants were represented by a Salt Lake attorney, James 
Richards. (Tr. VIII:4475; 111:3277) 
In March 1989, the parties each signed the Redemption 
Agreement dated February 28, 1989 (Exh. 31 - App.), pursuant to 
which Ong agreed to pay an additional $440,220.00 over a period 
of time to 11th Avenue Corporation to redeem the latter1s 
interest in the Mausoleum partnership. (Exh. 31, Tr. 11:3054-5) 
In the Redemption Agreement (Exh. 31), the Plaintiffs each 
released Defendants from any and all claims, known or unknown, a 
follows: 
13.2 Release by the Partnership. Except as 
otherwise provided in this Agreement, the Partnership, 
its partners, their respective agents, officers, 
employees, successors, assigns and heirs, and each of 
them, forever discharge SLMM its agents, officers and 
employees from any and all claims, demands, rights of 
action or causes of action, whether known or unknown, 
howsoever arising, which in any way are based upon or 
related to SLMM's association with the Partnership. 
This "release" and "discharge" language was drafted by Ong's 
attorney and was inserted by him in the Agreement. 
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H. Plaintiffs' Operation of the Mausoleum 
Over one year later, by June 1990, Plaintiffs had stopped ^ 
selling outdoor crypts. (Tr. 11:3096) After the March 1989 
Redemption Agreement and through June of 1990, Plaintiffs 
operated the Mausoleum business at an operating loss of ^ 
$219,000.00. (Tr. IX:4518) During this period, Alldredge's 
personal corporation, D&D Management, was paid over $11,500.00 a 
month out of the Mausoleum for management. (Tr. 11:3017-18) < 
Plaintiffs sold not more than three outdoor crypts during this 
period. Plaintiffs' loss was 212% of their sales. (Exh. 247; 
Tr. IX:4517-19, 4572) ( 
I. Plaintiffs' Claimed Discovery of Wood Crypts 
In July of 1989, Plaintiff Alldredge was told by his < 
secretary, Jeri Stevens, that she was informed that there was or 
might be wood in the crypts of the outdoor garden pavilions. 
(Tr. 11:3062-63) He commented to her that "the Mausoleum deal ' 
has been concluded" and he did not want to be bothered with it. 
(Tr. 111:3308) At that time, Mr. Alldredge was in the middle of 
addressing another dispute with Mr. Garner and took no action to 
verify this information from Mrs. Stevens. (Tr. 111:3305-08) 
In April of 1990, when Plaintiff Alldredge decided to 
"catalog" all of the grievances he harbored against Mr. Garner, 
he suddenly "remembered" what his secretary had told him the year 
before and decided to check it out. (Tr. 111:3306-07) 
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approximateIy 15 crypts i n 1t ie outdoor garden pavi1±u11a. w 
ri- crypts were observed to be made of u . .. (Tr« TT?3064-*>'i 
icedue ui fessed that he had no knowledge that - "'ypt ~ were 
' • ( 2 
j . ing . ' - Compla i lie instant matter as v *..\ .J90. 
•T The Lawsuit 
Befor- -r;,t). Defendants filec - - T it. - ^ cAciude 
j . < f*r A i n r v 
id. w . .«r . - * - , ; . . ' . ••» damages - J . d J« . p u r j . j d r . ' + 
U l a n Code n u n . •- J1 
mo f i p n IJHF ^ ^ n * <--, 
From * ! *- t ^ q , .. ^j moments o t t i i u . *-<'i ve r T h^ v^nLxiiaed 
1
 nprm" * - ; .i ,t . : i c ^ m s e l 
-•"etet * iw |L,r . :•, ^-: we.j * r *-. D e f e n d a n t G a r n e r . 
i n . v : '-' * ' 
r i a lined l h a ^ . .t- .vd , :, « : . . - . -:i . . ,,na . • *-, w, •
 3 
. v • *"f * ., •- .-n , •"•* • «' " i •• :• ' . a r " r >* 9 
' * : t r o d u c e a 
t i j n c i a i j t a t e m e ' ? :*. + . :\*A <** a s s e s s • , , . 0 , ^ 8 ; . : - * 
v i - .Af i . v : j / l i - i j ; 
: * a . r. . i ^  a ., i o t r^du^e'i o u m T 3 r { n s of M~ lar r.e- ' 3 J ~ ' r.* 
tax returns which incli ided hi s wife * s income (Exhs. ji /', 318 -
A|i: |: ; Ex 1: i 9 2 9 8 ) M i' s G a i ' i le r i s i 101: a pa rtv in t- b i <* rase Hut 
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i 
she owns substantial assets and has substantial income in her own 
right, which appeared on the exhibits received in evidence. ^ 
(Id.) 
The trial court allowed witnesses to describe sales 
presentations made to crypt purchasers years before the < 
representations that Plaintiffs claim were made in 1987 and 1988. 
(Tr. VI:3915, 4014) 
At trial, Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to ( 
damages, as well as rescission. No adequate election of remedies 
was ever made, except in the judgment itself. (R. 3:1208-11, 
1288-99, 1398; Tr. VI:3958-9) i 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The two [-. m c i p a l . *s .*- ^ is^ center . i e t h e r 
a ^omp] e t e r e : 1 
1
 ' k ii o w n a n d i i n k n o w r if,! c 1 a i m s w i 11 b e g I v e • i i effect and enforced by 
the court; ai id (2) whei I ii I the course O L -_ .• .- '.* a 
p 1 ai ntiff "parade" before the jury the alleged ^a.;:-. a 
defendant in a case where the plaintiffs seek to recover punitive 
(.Ljiiiaqe'S . 
Defendants maintain the release p- v*s:o> f the Redemption 
Agreement was exenil nil by I in> | I,-I i I M • • * i 
they ^^M1-* ' ; n^<r- _:...• * togethe: : *; r ..-. f , : .ad 
» st • -• confidence Defendant 'id'^ei. l u C woiuxiig 
was intended .< : . absolutely release rr> respect) .-P p r t i e s 
i • . ? t e 
a b s o j -«. i e f e n d a r r _ i .!»• . ^  s - - -.-\ i,d -- • Ou» * t-• ^  p t 
it O t M e / W i i i t i u a j i i a v c L>ee i i S ^ e C i l i C d i i ^ i c o e i v e d -Lli Lntr 
a g • K : rr- t . 
i'ht- subseqiiiriit f i l I ng of t h e Comp] a i n t by I . J . I U ,:' s 
a 1J e g i n g f r a i i < 11: 11 E? :ii m: i cl i i c ' e III e i 11 : • f 11: I e : J : i :j 
Agreement after over a year of operat Ion: i c £ Mausoleum l l- - • 
a t a s u b s t a n t i a J ] o s s,, w I i i c h merely served t o i: e v i v e t h e i r 
h o s t :li ] i t y I: c x ; a i: • :I D e £ e i i d a i 11 s , t • u i j I d 111 ,i I , e i v e t • :> a v o i d t h e i: e 1 ease 
which t h e y had K ri- w, IQ . \ J:*.L. .••r^n» . A\^ . - . , r - ; ; i : e a , 
i ' f ie u i d i - . 
about Defendant G a r n e r ' s a l l e g e d w e a l t h a..; . p r o d u c e - . : a t - . t ..: 
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i 
his assets prior to a finding that Defendants were liable, 
(§78-18-1(2) (Supp. 1992). Nor did the trial court follow the
 ( 
guidelines set forth by this Court in Crookston v. Fire Ins, 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (1991), which was decided before the trial 
in this case and which had been tried before the same judge. { 
By its rulings and its comments during the course of the 
trial, the lower court created an atmosphere which had the effect 
of confusing the jury and engendering passion and prejudice which \ 
prevented Defendants from having a fair trial. This was evident 
from the special verdict returned by the jury on the issue of 
punitive damages, as well as the issue relating to conversion of i 
assets; among others. The treatment of the court of the issue 
relating to the election of remedies and submitting the issue of 
damages for fraud to the jury further added to the jury's ( 
confusion. 
Finally, the court failed to follow the law in respect to 
awarding costs to Plaintiffs, if indeed the Plaintiffs were 
entitled to costs, and awarded Plaintiffs all costs incurred in 
connection with all depositions taken by either party. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE THE 
UNAMBIGUOUS RELEASE LANGUAGE OF THE REDEMPTION AGREEMENT 
THAT BARS ALI. OF PLAINTIFFS 1 CLAIMS 
A. The Release Language of the Redemption Agreement is Clear y 
Unambiguous, and Comprehensive, and Barred all of 
plaintiffs' Claims, "Known and Unknown." 
After oper * • • ^--tnership with Defendants for 
severdj. ULUUL 
longe*" rorf : >.,* ± D e f e n d a n t s 1 p a r t n e r s . A f t - t pa .f 
n e g o t i a t e d the terms r •«-•• v •.-, •.- ^ ie^~ r^ 2 1 ^ s .:: 
"R e d e m p t i o n -,:• t- « , • .5 n ^ f . ^ iJij.. r r! -
1 •j 1 i e e 11 e d D e f E; I 1 d a 1: 11 s ,! p a 1: t: 1 1 e :i : s 1: 1 i j: • i 1: :i t e 1: e s t. 
The Redemption Agreement included a specific, unambiguous, 
,v. • comprehensi • - pd:-- - language :)l: which -%,:-, *• : r , ied 
> ' . , .aragraph . * .he 
Agreement, , ; vi.je * • ji . ,3 * :r.- elease and discharge 
. S L M K „s agents, otticers, and employees [e.g. 
Mr. Garner, irom any and all claims, demands, rights of 
action or causes of action, whether known or unknown, 
howsoever arising, which in any way are based upon or 
related to SLMM's association with the Partnership. 
(Emphasis added ) 
( Exh. :.. , pp 9™ . 0 , 
r'aragrapn 1 /. 2 of the Redempt Io 1: 1 Agreement a 1 s* 
ai 1 "enti reties clause" that provides, i 11 relevant parti 
This Agreement is one of a series of agreements that 
constitute one integrated transaction between the 
p a 1: t :i e s t h e r e t o per t a I n I n g t o t h e subject matte r h e r e o f 
and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements 
and understandings of the parties. There are no 
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{ 
It would be difficult to imagine release language more 
encompassing or comprehensive than this. The agreement's release ^ 
language is clear. It is not in any way ambiguous under any 
reasonable construction. The trial court's interpretation and 
failure to enforce these terms is accorded no deference on ( 
appeal. An appellate court will read the language for itself and 
then will construe and apply the unambiguous and all-encompassing 
release provision according to its plain and simple language. < 
Winet v. Price, Slip. Op. 3-4, 1992 W.L. 55288 (Cal.App. Mar. 23, 
1992); accord Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) 
(Interpreting the language of a conveyance of mineral rights); < 
Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 132 (Utah App. 1991). 
The release language clearly encompasses all four factual 
claims of the Complaint, to wit: (1) alleged misrepresentation { 
as to the manner of construction of the outdoor pavilion crypts; 
(2) the alleged failure of the pavilion construction to comply 
with applicable building codes and ordinances; (3) payment of ' 
real property taxes; and (4) the alleged conversion of 
partnership property by reservation of various crypts in the 
indoor mausoleum building. (R. 1:7-16) These matters were 
clearly "based on or related to SLMM's association with the 
Partnership" because the Mausoleum was the object of the 
warranties, representations or other agreements between 
the parties in connection with the subject matter 
hereof except as described herein. (Exh. 31, p.15) 
(Emphasis added.) 
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p.jir • M*M iihj|i 11111 i In i i /pi «,i wi'i i» i'ufii i iljiiii I-ij by D e f e n d a n t s t u t h e 
p a r t n e r s h i p , 
A l l d i e d u e liiiiisi III! iDpiiii nil 1/ he I i i ' ed I hi i I Ihe Hedempl imi 
Agreement and r e l e a s e cuI uII P J a I nI I 11 s ' c 1 a inis i n t h i s eaSP , 
hi 1989, when he c l d i m s he was f i r s t t o l d by h i s s e c r e t a r y 1 h a t 
prrM 1 J on i i
 ; p i i ui i i i'oris i i u c i e u 11 wnini, m - i epl j ed hniai I ne 
d e a l "had been c o n c l u d e d " and -it •; -. * oe o o t h e r e d 
I - ...111 i n i I I »• ill 
* -' if. •- --CJ <-- * > . -ud i r,f- 'Heir c r y p t s i: lad been i m p r o p e r ! y 
Q rted ;«o-- : he Limt ne signed the Redemption 
f - et-MUe 
Morec - , •' language r paragraph - *. 7 specified : y 
a^> i ;*:, whether known or unknown Emphasis added I h 
vii.-ssiur.i • ;.i . ,.i-.*- ; eleasing when they signed - * *• Redempt•< n 
A<i| J e e i i i e n t , 
linen that; t i i r i r Al • ^: • * « - ' • •* • ^ ' i - j ' U - , * i < - r t h e n K \ wi; : ..ne 
or m^re JT * *•- * .** .* .* . -lectbtru. 
h a f - M r C * > >~» o r« -a i /^  4-/-N M r 
Ong • J handwr,' fei faxed le? *- dated Mc. . *• _, _ J - 9 # regarding 
t J: le - i- M : 
v, : * : diou cou: ler a separdie ieleabe for
 : .; to sign. 
Basically, the idea is that our three corporations and 
we three individuals will mutually release each other 
from unspecified liabilities, KEG and I will sign both 
corporate and personal releases in the agreement 
itself, while your corporate release will be in 
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( 
agreement and your personal release will be outside and 
separate from the agreement. (Emphasis added.) 
To excuse Plaintiffs from their release because ". . .we didn't 
know" negates the express language of the Redemption Agreement. 
In Winet v. Price, Slip. Op. 1992 W.L. 55288 (Cal.App. 
Mar. 23, 1992), the California Court of Appeal affirmed the 
enforcement of an agreement "releasing all claims against a 
party, including unknown and unsuspected claims" that barred the 
plaintiff's claim that the defendant breached his duty as a 
general partner. (Slip. Op. at 1-2) In enforcing an accord and 
satisfaction to bar an unasserted attorney fee claim under a 
contract, this Court has stated that "[u]nknown claims and 
liability may be extinguished if the parties so intend." Quealy 
v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah 1986).3 
Plaintiffs' self-serving disclaimers at trial that they did 
not "intend" to release any claim for past misrepresentations 
cannot be countenanced by this Court. Where the release language 
is clear, effect must be given to the intent of the parties as 
indicated by the language they employed in the agreement. Lucio 
v. Curran, 2 N.Y.2d 157, 161, 139 N.E.2d 133, 135-6 (1956). Even 
if their unexpressed and uncommunicated "intent" not to release 
their present claims were considered credible, "[i]t is the 
outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party's 
J
 See also Kolar v. Ray, 97 111.Dec. 240, 492 N.E.2d 899, 
902 (1986) (Court enforced a release of any and all claims, 
"known and unknown, foreseen and unforseen"); Paradisco v. 
Colonial Townhouses, Inc., 138 Misc.2d 1002, 526 N.Y.S.2d 308, 
312-13 (1988) (Plaintiff's claim was embraced by the release 
whether specifically known or not). 
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u n e x p r e s s e d ii i t e n t i o n w h i c h I h o c o m I W I ! I M n l n r r f I,! Wii l e t , 
SI i p . O p . a t 4 . 4 
T h e i : e w a s i i -: ^k*- -1 • - > M * r >•- i e f f e c t u i m e 
d • : 21 11 •. • hpv wpre s i q n . n g 
r e l e a s e e •.-. important language t wn,. M v<jb p r ^ w d e e ^ 
i I ( ) | I r i i v <••• I i 
language mea..t * ria-u: i;; - . - .iuntd: n , agreed to this 
* *- ease language, and that language should be enforced to bar all 
In Horgan v ^ Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 
] 9 8 2 ) 11: i ii s C • : i 11 : t: 1: i e J < ::l 111. i i «i i e I e a s e i s a :: : i 11 r a c t a i I d s h c \ 13 d 
ei if or ced , or rescinded , on it he same gr< : i n ids as anv other 
coi itract. "Ti le ''encouragement" and "preservat nan" ,*t settlements 
»jims r-nnst ;>.• ., npo argument . e M o i « ~n.n releases," 
Id, a* *) iquci m q w i h t v. Wat kins, u, r. Oh-;, .- * "i-dska 
• i li . ju'. • r 
• '^jiik t- J<. h ..^ i Horgan pr jtesteo •* <ao signed -,fc release 
wix^y jndei a ^ i e ^ a' i 
's aopare, * ,^ .;; z . ;< Redempt .o n ^qreene n^ 
i •": release .a.-it ;i - -lldredge r^n: . n tjd •; b rood ove: nis 
* See also Kolar v. Ray, 492 N.E.2d at 902 ("We look to the 
release itself to determine its scope. Where a written agreement 
is clear and expli cit, a cot u t must enforce it as written."); 
Paradisco v. Colonial Townhouses, Inc., 526 N.Y.S.2d at 312 
("Full effect must be given to the intent of the parties as 
reflected by the language used by them.) 
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Horgan and the other authorities cited herein, his "feeling of 
latent discontent" is an insufficient basis upon which to allow 
Plaintiffs1 claims. Horgan, 657 P.2d at 754. The release 
provision of the Redemption Agreement is clear and unambiguous. 
Its plain language encompasses and bars all of Plaintiffs1 
claims. The release must be enforced and the judgment below 
reversed as a matter of law. 
B. Execution of the Redemption Agreement was not Induced by 
Fraud. 
Plaintiffs scurry to avoid the strong, all-encompassing 
release in the Redemption Agreement by arguing that the release 
was procured by Defendants' fraud. Plaintiffs' contentions of 
fraud rest solely upon their claims that the construction of the 
outdoor garden crypts was misrepresented by Mr. Garner and that 
such misrepresentations were so critical and substantial that 
they were not affected by the knowing and voluntary release 
provisions of the Redemption Agreement. 
The evidence was sharply divided as to whether or not the 
crypts were misrepresented before the partnership. However, the 
evidence was undisputed that the representations were made in 
1987 and 1988, before the parties' partnership and well before 
that partnership was terminated when each side released the other 
from all liability and responsibility. The record is entirely 
devoid of any evidence that Mr. Garner represented or concealed 
the nature of the crypts after the partnership commenced in 
May 1988. 
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Agreeme* - o e n e v e o trust m e y : o • et :: wronged i> d e f e n d a n t s 
iii s e v e r a l r e s p e c t s , ^uueLhexeb^ * * a l l know±eu-jt L m e 
cri,[< :: ,, t h e :i r e l e a s e l anguage , * - d, i ng upon *-Ke ^ a , - i c e of 
t v i r a t t o r n e y , t ney s i g n e d the Redempt} v -o cement w i -~ r : , c v c i 
r>t * * t rt . r i •. ( - * * '- .; r ; « , „ j \ • ' t * f *•- r. r 
Attoiiic James Richards, vnu advib^a iifi , Instil i ed 
that he reviewed release language proposed by Plaintiffs' 
a r t o i.ir-\ . - - ; • • h*-ir ^  was awar e o£ P I ain11 f f s f 11ense fppii-qf 
• : G a r i i • = • • T I: 1 e 1 J i=i i it 1 : i f f 3 '"'
 £ • .- e J ^  c 
language was r ended *o ei id al ] disputes between * • - parries 
{ L L . VIII:44ob-/D/ 4 ^ ; 111:3282) 
Even i f one accepts that Plaintiffs knew nothing of the wood 
crypts when they sigi led the Redemption! Agreemen* thete is no 
*: . v * endaii ts 
ever gave iJicti nt. 1 i rs any fa] ^  uii^nnai . JI. concerr . „ e 
COnstiuutiur 
prevented f r ,;L . .ibpcv. . , i,., i
 f . ,. t- 1 ,-^t . g di ; ,; - ; ^ s e crypiif 
<1;,: i. 1.1-; ' v , -it- in. n • • ,.^  • * •> 4 *f - - • ldredge ^ f 1 ^  - -
• * 1- p a n it:: . > ? ;,j ^epcira* e legal represen it: ! n 
negot a* : tie Redemp' . c• :r Yemeni., 
misplaced tr,iancp \ . '.:?*- mht. • undisputed L a ^ i t>.rp"!y 
, .: nut supper L a c-a-xii wi a contiiiuiii^ joncealmeni w^ u ^ 
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pavilion construction or that Defendants fraudulently "induced" 
the Redemption Agreement. ( 
In Ingram Corp. v, J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295 
(5th Cir. 1983), plaintiff Ingram agreed to sell its assets in 
the marine construction industry to a major competitor, I 
McDermott. When numerous disputes arose between the parties 
concerning Ingram's unfinished construction work, a settlement 
agreement was reached in which Ingram agreed to pay McDermott a { 
sum in excess of $1.2 million with an exchange of releases. 
Ingram agreed to release McDermott "from all manner of 
actions, causes of actions, suits, . . . claims and demands ' 
whatsoever in law, in admiralty, or in equity, . . . including 
without limitation of the generality hereof, any past, present or 
future claims, matters, causes or things that [Ingram] has or may 
hereafter have arising out of, based upon or in any way related 
to" the various prior agreements between the parties. Id. 
at 1302, n.ll. 
Ingram later sued, claiming that its earlier releases were 
vitiated due to McDermott1s fraud. The trial court refused to 
grant McDermott's summary judgment on the plain language of the 
encompassing release. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for 
judgment against Ingram, concluding that the "unmistakably clear 
language" of the releases "negotiated by commercial parties with 
substantially equal bargaining power," meant exactly what they 
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u l i l f i i i 1 i ,\t ' h i j l i l i . t ) P I l ( k J ! « J I I I ' " I d l l h f i tli i l i d 1 , I;'i - I ! . i"» I d . d t 
1 3 1 2 . 
. . . It does i lot matter that Ingram may not have 
known of or articulately considered all the possible 
claims it was relinquishing against McDermott . 
when a release provides that "any and all claims/ 1 
"past, present, or future" are to be extinguished, a 
court I s require! * • '•*"" roe its provisions both as to 
known and unkn- ; M 
Both Messr .••'*; • * - ldredge were and are I ntell i gent 
b i i s I n e s s in e i i i: • e a 1 d b \ 1 s i i i e 3 3 
venturesi, and, Indeed, :i 1 1 the i nternat i ona 1 operations o£ 
business. (Tr. V:3 793, 3 79 7 99; 1:2936-43; 11:29/4, JX19) m 
releasing jere: ..-...,.* : , *= wpr» represented or^ advi^^H ^ 
experienced .* \ : \- \\ icated legal counse * their * ^ — s;ng 
that Garner •• - -oo: *,nership misrepresent jt 1 >ns , :r,sr;* ited 
fraudulent inducement ut cti- '>*iedbe ; 
T'HP Ingram cour*- waq ™ of*1"1 *-** eleases might .IH v i M a ^ e d 
In, ^:aLdi (.r \ nducement Howeve - ngram 'i«- -e ^^* 
1 1 , ifie negotiation 
of the releases . " ( Emphas 15 added. ) t>">H II"1, 2d at 1315 , 
Plaint I L L S Ong aiiu r^,ldredq^ 1, *J " * • - » . • . • 
^itjuep: ,- r\ or m i srepresentd r. ion . .: defendant 
5See also Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 921 F.2d 595, 602 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (Claims unknown to the releasor at the time it gave a 
release are barred when covered by the release language.); Nat f 1 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. Circle, Inc., 
915 F.2d 986, 989-91 (5th Cir. 1990) (Release of a claim val1led 
at over $200,000 was not objectively absurd, even if unwise, 
where the val ne of the released claim was both unknown and 
unknowafa1e at the t i me the re1ease was q i ven.} 
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( 
negotiation and conclusion of the Redemption Agreement and its 
release. The only evidence of misrepresentation by Defendants is 
Plaintiffs1 testimony that they were not told of wooden crypts 
before the partnership in 1988. Any argument that the 
Plaintiffs' release of claims was procured or induced by 
Defendants' misrepresentation is wholly premised on that evidence 
alone. Such evidence led only to a partnership agreement and is 
far too collateral and removed in time to have affected the 
validity of a comprehensive release thereafter knowingly and 
voluntarily given, without coercion or duress, and with counsel's 
advice. 
Plaintiffs would have this Court, as well as the trial court 
and jury, believe that to construct a garden pavilion mausoleum 
with wooden crypts is inherently fraudulent and deceptive. At 
the time, however, Mr. Alldredge was said to have extolled 
Mr. Garner as an "innovator." (Tr. VIII:4331; IX:4652, 4655, 
4680) There was no building or other code that was violated 
merely by constructing the crypts of wood. (Tr. VIII:4437; 
IV:3491-2) 
6Bakamus v. Albert, 1 Wash. 2d 241, 95 P.2d 767, 771 (1939) 
(appellant unsuccessfully asserted her ignorance of the claim at 
the time she signed the release that barred the claim); Houston 
v. Trower, 297 F. 558 (8th Cir. 1924); Barbour v. Poncelor, 
203 Ala. 386, 83 So. 130, 132-33 (1919) (recently followed in 
Regional Health Services, Inc. v. Hale Co. Hospital Bd., 565 S.2d 
109, 113-14 (Ala. 1990).); Accord Pettinelli v. Danzig, 
722 F.2d 706, 710 (11th Cir. 1984) ("When negotiating or 
attempting to compromise an existing controversy over fraud and 
dishonesty it is unreasonable to rely on representations made by 
the allegedly dishonest parties."). 
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C o i :i s e q i i e i :i, 11 j , D e f e i I d a i 11 s s i :i lb nil i t 11: i a t at s a 1:1:1 a 11 e 1: c • f 1 a w, 
t h e r e was 1 1 o d u t y a f f I r ma t i v e 1 y t o d i s c II o s e t h e c r y p t 
co n s 11: \ I c t i • i) n i 1 1 £ o 1 : ma t i c • 1 :i a I: t e r 1:1: 1 e pa 1: 1:1 1 e r s h i p lbeg a n , 
particular ,
 ;,< .vi^re Plaint i ff Alldredge spent v:i rti lally every day 
at the Mauso *-*•:!!' for* over eight months before siqn i nq the 
Redenipi. J u IUHII: j nil) 1 IN-.» had urn J inn 1 tj,d a c c e s s 
to the crypts ai id could have i n spec ted the inter ior of ai ly or al 1 
c: 1: them Ii ideed , il: le ; « a HIPS !~ ed In
 r" 11 j r IMIJ r I o ai. 1 i s t i 1 1, till: ite 
t- 1 jmbment u tmc m- 1 * ! ** , ; . , 
' *?H- -^  > tit ooci^-J - - i '..?• - : s> v e r e d the l a L i b ±.L n e 
j. or rnn 'iqi, . : v , 
- b u r d e n e s t a b l i . ^ N ? " *^° ' ^j.-ci^se r it- m<i* c. 
Bank of Utah, N.A, v . Banberry Development Corp , J Z>~., 
1329-Ji ((J*-an Iai* *e'.P'-* *f;o* ; - idb been uduieu . a 
.1 * ^t
 tur : .; iecide. Id, Defendants suom.t 
* ,1', unde ne ai„.'.» t ; ' f ; i - r-- ; . - *- -A *-*,r-^.-.- - f^e^r 
^.-.anLeti , > ,airf : ; ... mformat .jn J :^i enm.h - * :u* .. t- f the 
outdoor crypts" construction. 
7Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1982) (A financing 
partner did not breach his fiduciary duty to the managing par trier 
by failiiig to voluntarily disclose the value of the managing 
partnerfs partnership interest sold to the financing partner, as 
the managing partner had access to information concerning this 
value); Utah Code Ann. §48-1-17 (1989) (A partner is obliged to 
provide "true and full information of al 1 things affecti ng the 
partnersh i n,f t-n anni-hpr oartn^r .,J.M- • demand.) 
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( 
Defendants further submit that whether the crypts within the 
concrete pavilions were made of wood or of reinforced concrete is 
immaterial/ as long as they were built structurally sound and in 
a reasonable workmanlike manner. As pointed out in section 
III.B.2., below. Defendants were precluded from fully presenting 
their expert evidence that such was the case. Plaintiffs' 
evidence utterly fails to establish the legal or factual 
materiality of any misrepresentation of wooden crypts. 
Plaintiffs1 "expert11 critics were James Milne and Cramer 
Stiff. Mr. Milne, an engineer who had built concrete mausoleums 
in other states (but not in Utah), addressed such matters as 
whether the recesses for marble facing were aesthetically 
desirable or whether the ventilation system might have been 
better. (Tr. IV:3581, 3599-600) He opined that the crypts 
should have a "drainage system/1 although he admitted such a 
system was really needed for only one in every several hundred 
crypts. (Tr. IV-.3618) 
Mr. Stiff claimed expertise as a "sales consultant." He did 
not believe that the wood crypts could be sold if customers had 
been informed that they were wood. (Tr. VI:3971) Stiff admitted 
that he had no experience selling wooden crypts and had never 
tried. (Tr. VI:4007) In fact, before he was told that the 
outdoor crypts were partially constructed of wood, he 
specifically praised the outdoor garden pavilions and their 
design. He considered them aesthetically pleasing and secure. 
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(it . V i;39 9 3 ) M i: S t i £ f i i e v e i: a d d r e s s e d 11: i e s t r e i: I g 11: I :> r 
d i i r a b i 1 i t y o f t he wood crypts. 
Mr. Sti f'f's clai fit that t .he wooder crypts ^r- unsalable was 
; . 11 radi c t e d bi Di: u i rgii ] Kc * -* <• - < J *. - : ft a s e d 
a r y p t knowi i lg I t was wood ( T r . yrIl . 4387-88 ^ ;be - • 
i e ma i iag e r :> f a i it 0 gd e i: l mai i s ' - , 
.^  J I experience as an embalmei: ^ician :> •: sales 
manager, and had sol d wooden compartments for cremated remains 
a i :l w ::»o d c a s k e t s . (T r u 111 4 i I i- L , : •«: J <* 
experlei'-*- " -.* wood crypts are ^s^ salable : -i - v ^ nctrketable. 
(T • 4] 8) 
Defendai it :s"" expert, Dr Schroeder, a professor of wood 
chemistry at Colorado state UnIvers11y t testified that ! : 1 ie wood 
ii s e d i n 1 h e c o n s t r u e t i o n ,f i s d u r a b 1 e ": ( r • : « - 1 1 : 4 2 5 7 ) I I e - ^ d 
I I a v e e 1 a b o r a t e d o i i t h i s t e s t :i m o n y a s t o w 1: i a t h e in e a n t lb y 
"" • :i i i :i : a b i ] ii t;;, •""' j !: I: e 1 I ii :l lb e e • i i p e r in i 1 1 • E; d t: ] t: i: i e c :) I i r t t • : i : s o . 
(See Defendai its "' Proffer of Proof ; Tr ht ig 2] ,  1 991 i 4495-4499 ) 
Dr Reaveley al so testified that "the wood used i n th is 
app1icat ion I ns ide a c1osed pavI ] i on wo\ i] d 1 a s t i n d e f i n i t e ] y and 
w o \ 11 d c a r r y t h o s e 1 o a d s f o r a n i n d e f i n i t: e p e r i o d o f t i in e . I 
i in e a i i., i t c i i) i i J :I g c: : • i it f : • r :: e i :t t: i I r :i e s , :i: e a ] II ;  "' ' ( T i : ; 1 111: 12 8 8 ) 
Tt i L s t e s t i moi I y o f s t r u c t u r a 1 1 n t e g r i t y • #a s ne v e r co n t r o v e r t ed b y 
Plaint I ffs 
Tl: lere . *• t- anynnp w ..
 r. ..,;::a^-. a wooden 
c r y p t a t t h e M a u s o 1 e u m h a d e v e r s o u g h t t o r e s c i n d ^ L-
b e c a i i s e • : • f 11: I e x ; : c c r i ;i c t :li o i i D m i r :i i i g I, It i e
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were constructed there was never any attempt to conceal the 
nature of the construction from public view. And, Plaintiffs 
failed to prove that the wood construction of the crypts was ever 
a material fact either to Plaintiffs1 investment or to their 
release of claims. 
" [I]n order to overcome the effect of a release or other 
written instrument, the contrary evidence must be clear and 
convincing." Maxfield v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 
8 Utah 2d 183, 330 P.2d 1018, 1019 (1958). Here, there simply 
was no evidence that the Redemption Agreement itself was procured 
by any fraud, let alone evidence that might be considered to meet 
the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. 
Plaintiffs wish to bind Defendants to the obligations and to 
the benefits which Plaintiffs derived from the Redemption 
Agreement. Yet, Plaintiffs are unwilling to accept their 
responsibilities which they voluntarily undertook and the legal 
obligations and liabilities resulting from the release in that 
agreement. 
By the release language of this agreement, Plaintiffs 
released all claims against Defendants, including all the claims 
in this case, known and unknown. The trial court particularly 
erred by refusing to enforce the release provisions and voiding 
the Redemption Agreement, but still purporting to enforce some of 
its other provisions. (Judgment, p.10 - Add. "P") This Court 
should enforce the release according to its plain language and 
reverse the judgment below. 
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POINT II 
THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS FATALLY FLAWED BECAUSE 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONSIDER 
MR. GARNER'S WEALTH AND EXERCISE UNSTRUCTURED CAPRICE 
A The Trial Court Improperly Allowed the Jurors to Hear and 
Consider Claims and Evidence of Defendant Garner's Wealth, 
] No Relevant Purpose is Served by Allowing the Jury to 
Consider Evidence of a Defendant's Financial Wealth. 
•'ar.it ;vs:' damages are a powerful weapon in rhe 
adiin i ii i s f r.; Il iiiipi i"ii;M I w i it in! u i l h it-oil r a i n l , 
they have the potent Lai to advance legitimate r ^ e s h Imposed 
indiscriminate^ - however, they have a uev i * ; : aJ for 
q 
harm. 
Appar* :, t'C^;qn; rio '.< rr- t- ^i* r~ mj 
v:^ced r.j dissatisfac^j. •'•< . ^ consistent state r *> •*- -,w 
, ^  jdrdi -i aniLiv- damage- , 
*
rv processes u^ea u~ - r . •- ; .- t-vi^ w, w damage .-a 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, Bl)2 (Utah 
11 S 9 11 ) 9 
"Hi- Crookston decision was issued barely more thai i oi ie 
month before the trial began m uus • ' - ~i^K:± -•• 
this case were tried before the same L: J U*J-^ ; • ^ • *-H :-»*-^ r-rt 
ft 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co, v. Haslip, 
U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1056 (1991) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
See also Tuckfield, i^*- :*-. Jtah — Time For 
a Clear Standard," 1989 B.Y « jr judges are left 
to struggle with conflicting precedent when iristructing the jury 
on punitive damages). 
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action the jury awarded Plaintiffs $1.8 million in punitive 
damages. The trial judge refused to ameliorate the jury's "over 
indulgence." (Memorandum Decision; R. 6:2532) 
Crookston fixes the primary responsibility for review of 
punitive damage awards and provides a "mechanism" for "further 
development of the law." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 813. The 
instant matter is such a case for "further development." 
However, Crookston provides little or no guidance to a trial 
judge or jury as to the means or methods to be employed in the 
initial consideration and determination of an amount of damages 
to be awarded, if any, to achieve the valid purposes of 
deterrence or retribution. Such guidance is most critical to a 
"sounder law" of punitive damages which Defendants, and, we 
believe, this Court seek. 
From the opening moments of the trial, Plaintiffs were 
allowed to parade before the jury Mr. Garner's financial 
condition and ostensible wealth as a "multi-millionaire." (Tr. 
1:2919; V:3700-13; VII:4124-5) Jurors were also later instructed 
that they must consider Defendants' wealth in assessing an amount 
of punitive damages. (Instr. 51; R. 5:1852) This Court has 
recognized that a permissible factor employed in assessing the 
amount of punitives to be awarded includes the "relative wealth 
of the Defendant." Id. at 808; Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 
771 (Utah 1985). However, as Crookston observes, no objective 
Utah analysis has ever considered whether, in fact, the issue of 
a defendant's "wealth" is a legitimate factor. "No relative 
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formulas have been established for properly evaluating them when 
makii lg ai i award or wi lei i reviewing uie i - ' r \ '• -> d 
The fi nder of fact h a s no q u i d a n ^ .>\. • * .-ML. weight r 




 . j c t A . ;D mandate ' " I \ ^ e 
G a m e r D e f e n d a n t s " % >carce ly be t t* .5 g u i d a n c e n a 
r e v e a l - a d e e p e r r 1 -1 * t i t i 
* . ; . :• • ' ! P more 
t h a n ui,.
 t , t ;3., W»(J — r , , »j, -. oe: ' 
r ?e"e loped ai .ux,- . , - common argumer j a s s e s s m e n t ,: a 
de f endar * - : *i • * * 1 , i r p o s e s f v%< :^r w r o n g d o e r s ana 
t • : d e t e r f 1 1111 ;i 1: e co 1 1 d 1  1 c t , ma 1: 1 y ] eg a 1 s cI: 1 :> 1 a r s s e r i ou s 1 y qu e s t i o n 
t h a t c o 11 c 1 u s i o n , i: C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f M :i G a r n e 1:f s f i n a 1 1 c I a 1 
J
 Browning - Ferris Industries, Inc, v. K c c disposal, 
Inc. , 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1 989) (Brennan, j"." and Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
Annotation, "Punitive Damages: Relationship to 
Defendant's Wealth," 87 A.L.R. 4th 141 (1991). 
^ Abraham and Jeffries, "Punitive Damages and the Rule of 
Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth," 18 J. Legal Studies 415 
(J 1 m e 1989) (wealt .h is irrelevant to the goals of assessing 
retribution or deterring socially undesirable conduct); Case 
Note, "The Use of Evidence of Wealth in Assessing Punitive 
Damages in New York: Rupert v. Sellers," 44 Alb.L.Rev. 422 
(1980); Chapman and Trebilcock, "Punitive Damages: Divergence 
Search of a Rat i onal e," 40 Ala T. R P W 7*1 J 777-829 (Spri ng 1989), 
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condition in the instant matter encouraged jurors to focus upon 
his "status," with sugar-plumed visions of his wealth, and not 
upon his conduct. Jurors were invited to speculate on what else 
may have occurred in Defendant's past that resulted in his 
financial success. J The actual and prejudicial harm to 
Defendants from allowing jurors to consider such irrelevant 
evidence is obvious. 
Defendants submit that upon a thoughtful, objective 
analysis, evidence of Defendants1 financial condition should 
clearly be seen as irrelevant, either to compensate the 
Plaintiffs for their claimed wrongs or to serve any legitimate 
purpose of punishment or deterrence from conduct. This Court 
should no longer blindly accept the unevaluated notion that 
jurors must consider a defendant's wealth when assessing the 
liability for or the amount of punitive damages. The mandatory 
nature of the instruction, without flexible guidelines, invites 
virtual bankruptcy of a defendant, particularly in this case. 
2. The Trial Court Improperly Refused to Require a Finding 
of Liability for Punitive Damages Before Admitting 
Evidence of Defendant's Wealth Dnder Utah Code Ann. 
§78-18-1(2) (1992). 
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(2) (1992) requires that: 
Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition 
shall be admissible only after a finding of liability 
for punitive damages has been made. 
From the beginning of the trial, including Plaintiffs' 
opening statement, the jurors were repeatedly advised that 
1 3
 18 J. Legal Studies at 416. 
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Mr. Garner was a "multi-millionaire". (Tr. 1:2919; 11:3700-13; 
VII:4124-5) Even if such evidence is perceived relevant to 
affixing exemplary punishment, Defendants' financial ability to 
pay has absolutely no relevance whatever to the jury's 
consideration of Defendants' liability in the first instance. 
The prejudice to Defendants in allowing allegations and evidence 
of Mr. Garner's wealth to be repeatedly paraded before the jurors 
is obvious. "Rich men do not fare well before juries, and the 
more emphasis placed on their riches, the less well they fare."14 
Having denied Defendants' pre-trial motion in limine, 
the trial court also repeatedly denied their trial objections to 
the numerous references to Defendants' financial condition. 
(Tr. V:3700-03; VII:4123-25) Calling Mr. Garner as their own 
witness, Plaintiffs were allowed to lead a virtually unrestricted 
exploring foray into Mr. Garner's private finances, including his 
previous divorce from his wife. (Tr. V:3703-16, 3732-36) 
Indeed, the Court even allowed Plaintiffs to introduce financial 
summary exhibits, detailing not only the assets of Mr. Garner 
(which were primarily of a non-liquid nature), but also those of 
his wife, a non-party who owns substantial assets in her own 
right. (Tr. V:3703-10; VII:4122-26; VII:4235-37) 
-^Morris, "Punitive Damages in Tort Cases," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 
1173, 1191 (1931); See also Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 
1127-8 (Wyo. 1981), Cf. Ellis, "Punitive Damages, Due Process, 
and the Jury," 40 Ala.L.Rev. 975, 1001, (Spring 1989) ("The risks 
confronting a defendant from whom punitive damages are sought are 
daunting, especially where the case is complex and the defendant 
is not popular . . . " ) . 
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All of this evidence of finances and "ability to pay" 
were prominently interwoven with Plaintiffs' cries of fraud and 
deceit, and all before the jury had made any determination or 
finding of any liability. Defendants' wealth was obviously and 
prejudicially displayed by Plaintiffs to jurors who were 
requested to rectify Plaintiffs' claimed wrongs and find that 
this multi-millionaire Defendant should "pay" for those wrongs. 
In enacting §78-18-1 in 1989, the Legislature 
recognized a defendant's legitimate privacy and due process 
interests to be heard by an impartial, unprejudiced jury and to 
have liability and any compensation fixed without reference to 
his wealth. "The jury should determine whether there has been a 
breach in the standard first without looking at any assets, and 
then after that they should have a right to look at the assets." 
Senator H. Barlow, Senate Debate, SB24, Feb. 2, 1989, Day No. 25, 
48th Legislature, Tape No. 25. 
Refusing to apply §78-18-1(2), the trial court 
considered the statute "not applicable" but "prospective only" 
for "reasons" argued by the Plaintiffs. (M. Entry, R. 4:1398) 
On appeal, this Court gives no deference to the trial judge's 
interpretation of either the statute or to the admissibility of 
the evidence of Mr. Garner's wealth. These questions of law are 
reviewed by this Court under a "correctness standard." City of 
West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 
1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
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Section 78-18-1 was enacted/ effective May 1, 1989, and 
"applies to all claims for punitive damages that arise on or 
after that date." 1989 Utah Laws 717, §4. Plaintiffs argued, 
and the judge agreed, that their claims "arose" prior to the 
statute's effective date. However, Plaintiffs1 own trial 
testimony was clear that while the mausoleum and partnership 
agreements were fashioned in 1987 and 1988, other dealings 
complained of and Plaintiffs1 alleged "discovery" of the claimed 
"fraud" and misrepresentations occurred in May 1990, well after 
the effective date of the act. And, Plaintiffs1 complaint was 
not even filed until July 1990. 
Defendants submit that in order for Plaintiffs to avoid 
the release provisions of the Redemption Agreement, which was 
executed in March 1989, Plaintiffs must establish that their 
claims did not arise until their alleged discovery of the facts 
in 1990. If, as Plaintiffs argued to the trial court to avoid 
bifurcation, their claims "arose" before May 1989, then such 
claims also arose prior to and were released by Plaintiffs in 
their March 1989 Redemption Agreement. If, as Plaintiffs now 
contend, their claims were still undiscovered when the March 1989 
Release of Claims was given and Plaintiffs could not have 
released claims they did not discover until May 1990 or later, 
then these punitive damage claims are subject to the bifurcated 
trial procedure mandated by §78-18-1. 
Subsection (2) of §78-18-1 is also "procedural" in 
nature because it prescribes a bifurcated trial procedure by 
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which Plaintiffs1 substantive fraud and damage claims are to be 
considered. Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 
731 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1986). Accord Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 
36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909). There is nothing "substantive" 
or "prospective-only" in this statute that would enlarge or 
eliminate Plaintiffs1 right to show exemplary damages. To 
require Plaintiffs to recognize Defendants' right to a fair 
consideration of Plaintiffs' claims by a jury, untainted by 
irrelevant evidence of wealth, should not be applied 
"prospective-only." Because a procedural statute applies not 
only to future actions but to accrued and pending actions as 
well, §78-18-1(2) was in effect during the entire pendency of 
this action and should have governed the trial procedure.15 
Liability for punitive damages should have been first determined 
before any reference to or evidence of Defendants' wealth was 
presented to the jury. 
We submit that this bifurcated trial statute, which was 
effective over one year prior to the filing of the Complaint in 
this action, was specifically intended, to apply to trials, such 
as this case, involving complex business transactions and 
investments and strong emotions. Plaintiffs seek damages 
astronomical to an average juror, and taint Defendant as a 
"multimillionaire" before the first witness even takes the stand. 
Any contention that the jury would not be influenced by 
15Docutel Olivetti Corp., 731 P.2d at 478; Petty v. Clark, 
113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948). 
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Defendants' wealth when they later considered Plaintiffs' 
parroting cries of fraud is incredulous. 
Before the trial, Plaintiffs indignantly insisted that 
"profound reasons" of policy, "pragmatic realities," and "past 
practice" precluded the application of this statutorily-mandated 
bifurcation. (Mem. Opp., R. 3:1266-67) Instead of sound 
analysis and discussion of those "reasons" and "realities," 
Plaintiffs provided only derogatory invectives. Plaintiffs 
viewed their own selfish interests and refused to recognize that 
defendants also have legitimate rights and interests to be 
protected and balanced against plaintiffs'. The only substantive 
objections Plaintiffs voiced against bifurcating the substantive 
issues from the punitive damages were allegations of delay, 
piecemeal litigation and "past practice." These objections to 
bifurcation have been soundly rejected by both cases and 
commentators. 
To require a jury first to find that a plaintiff is 
entitled to a punitive damage award before any evidence of wealth 
is considered does not materially delay or "piecemeal" the trial 
proceeding. Any such inconvenience is, at worst, minor, 
particularly when compared to the prejudice the defendant suffers 
from the current method the court employed.16 There is no delay 
when discovery of wealth is allowed (after a prima facie showing) 
16Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981). Rupert v. 
Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975); Cf. Miller v. 
O'Neill, 775 S.W.2d 56 (Tex.Ct.App. 1989) (quoting Campen with 
approval in upholding the trial court's ordered bifurcation). 
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at the pretrial discovery stage. There is no delay when a jury 
decides punitive damages should be awarded. A plaintiff can 
immediately submit evidence of a defendant's wealth before the 
same jurors and allow the jury immediately to deliberate further 
on the proper amount to be awarded. Powell and Leiferman, 
"Results Most Embarrassing: Discovery and Admissibility of Net 
Worth of the Defendant," 40 Baylor L.Rev. 527, 544 (1988). 
Bifurcation of trial proceedings may well enhance 
"speedier" litigation overall because the original proceeding is 
quicker, with less disruption given to irrelevant matters. Any 
need to hear or consider evidence regarding the amount of 
punitives later is eliminated when the evidence shows that an 
award would be unjustified. A defendant's rights are recognized 
and a plaintiff's claims are still considered in their proper 
context. Balance between the competing interests is preserved. 
Bifurcation of punitive damage issues is "sound rationale." ' 
The bifurcation of punitive damage issues or other 
means of limiting the admissibility of a defendant's financial 
condition is neither novel or unique. Several states have 
enacted statutory provisions which similarly restrict the 
admissibility and/or discovery of a defendant's financial 
17
 44 Alb.L.Rev., at 442-3. See also 40 Ala.L.Rev. at 999-
1007 (Bifurcation alleviates juries' confusions and is either 
required by statute or allowed by discretion in most 
jurisdictions). 
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condition where claims for punitive damages are asserted. ° 
Other state courts have led the way in balancing and protecting 
both defendant's and plaintiff's interests in the absence of 
legislative action. See Campen v. Stone/ 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 
1981); Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 368 N.Y.Supp.2d 904 
(1975); Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J.Super. 18, 185 A.2d 241 
(1962) .19 
Defendants submit that they are equally entitled to the 
same fair and unprejudicial hearing of the claims and defenses in 
this case as Plaintiffs. The trial court's refusal to bifurcate 
the proceeding and to preclude evidence of Defendants' financial 
condition until after a finding of liability was prejudicial 
error as a matter of law. The jury's verdict was clearly tainted 
xoIowa Code Ann. §668A.l (West 1991) (A prima facia case of 
"willful, wanton disregard" required to admit wealth evidence); 
Md. [Courts and Judicial Proceedings] Code Ann. §10-913 (1988) 
(Evidence of financial condition not admissible until liability 
found); Minn. Stat. Ann. §549.20 (West 1983) (Liability and 
damages shall be first awarded before admission of wealth 
evidence); Mo. Ann. Stat. §510.263 (Vernon 1987) (Wealth evidence 
admissible only in second proceeding); Mont. Code Ann. 
§27-1-221(7) (1978) (Wealth evidence not admissible in liability 
phase of trial and must be considered in a separate proceeding); 
Or. Rev. St. §41.315 (1989) (Prima facia evidence required before 
admission of wealth evidence). 
x
*See also Miller v. O'Neill, 775 S.W.2d 56 (Tex.Ct.App. 
1989) (The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
bifurcating the issue of punitive damage and wealth evidence.); 
Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 589 So.2d 684 (Ala. 1991) 
(Evidence of wealth is inadmissible during the liability phase of 
a trial for the purpose of proving the amount of punitive damages 
to be assessed.) 
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by references to and evidence of the financial conditions of 
Defendants and of even a non-party. 
B. The Punitive Damages Awarded are Excessive and Result from 
the Jury's Passion and Prejudice. 
The jury awarded Plaintiffs $1.8 million in punitive 
damages. The sheer size of this award alone requires careful 
scrutiny consistent with the criteria for such awards. 
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808-13. While Defendants did challenge 
the size of this award in a post-verdict motion for relief 
(R. 5:1920-22, 1937-67), the trial court upheld the award and 
denied the post-verdict motion, based only upon Plaintiffs' 
arguments in response to the motion. (R. 6:2181-2219, 2533-37) 
Remittitur of a punitive damage award is appropriate when, 
inter alia, (1) the award exceeds the proper ratio, (2) there is 
a "lack of intent or a low degree of malice," or (3) "a 
substantial risk of bankrupting the defendant" exists. Id. at 
811-12. Where the amount of punitives exceeds $100,000, then 
even a ratio less than three-to-one indicates "some inclination" 
by this Court to overturn or reduce the award. Id. at 810-11. 
The jury measured the legal damages for the "fraud" at 
$447,034.00, the difference of the Mausoleum's value, as 
represented by Defendants, over the Mausoleum's actual fair 
market value. (Verdict, II IV, A, 1; Add. "F") The $1.8 million 
punitive award is more than four times these legal damages 
assessed for the "fraud." 
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The trial court erroneously justified this award on the 
ground that the punitives were less than the $2.4 million awarded 
under Plaintiffs1 rescission and restitution theory. However, 
Defendants submit that the only proper measuring stick for 
punitives is the amount of legal damages, and not the amount 
awarded as restitution. Plaintiffs' "restitution" included over 
$1 million in investment interest and costs of operating the 
Mausoleum while in Plaintiffs' exclusive control and possession. 
(Exh. 89 - App.) Given Defendants' lack of control over these 
expenditures, no legitimate, salutary purpose can be served by 
punishing Defendants for Plaintiffs' mismanagement decisions. 
Even if one accepts Alldredge's self-serving testimony that 
the construction of wood crypts was misrepresented, there is no 
evidence of malice. Defendant Garner has had a long-standing 
preference for the natural warmth of wood as a construction 
material. (Tr.IX:4592) He was proud of wood and extolled its 
benefits, prompting reference to Mr. Garner as an "innovator." 
(Tr. IX:4652, 4655) 
And, as already argued herein, the wood construction of the 
outdoor crypts was not a material issue. Defendants had earlier 
left the crypts open for public view for a period of almost two 
years during their construction. Defendants never prevented 
Plaintiffs from discovering the construction or composition, and 
had even invited Plaintiff Alldredge to participate in an 
entombment where the inner construction material was plainly 
evident. Mr. Garner's representations as claimed by Plaintiffs 
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could not have been "intended" to harm Plaintiffs or others when 
the plan at the beginning was to have Plaintiff Ong own 50% of 
the stock in the Mausoleum, Garner owning 25%, Alldredge 10%, and 
the corporation to continue to own and operate the mausoleum 
business. (Exh. Ill) It was later changed to a partnership. 
(Exh. 28 - App.) 
Finally, the total award in this case, including the 
component for punitive damages, comes very close to achieving not 
recompense, but Mr. Garner's financial bankruptcy.20 At trial, 
Mr. Garner had less than $2 million in liquid assets. (Exh. 91 -
App.) His non-liquid assets were not easily convertible to cash. 
Mr. Garner outlined his current financial situation to the trial 
court with his belief that he must pursue relief in the 
bankruptcy court if forced immediately to liquidate his assets. 
(R. 5:1980-84, 1111 4, 6) Only with assistance of his wife was he 
ultimately able to post a supersedeas bond that saved him from 
forced execution sales of all his assets. Even so, he has had to 
pledge everything he has as security for the bond. (R. 7:2610-
13) As this Court is aware, Plaintiffs rejected Mr. Garner's 
offer to pledge all of his assets to Plaintiffs as a supersedeas 
bond on appeal. 
2 0
 See Ace Truck & Equipment Rentals, Inc., v. Kahn, 
103 Nev. 503, 746 P.2d 132 (1987) (A punitive award of 30 percent 
of defendant's net worth is far in excess of that reasonably 
necessary to punish defendant and deter others); National Bank of 
Monticello v. Doss, 141 111.App.3d 1065, 491 N.E.2d 106 (4th 
Dist. 1986), later proceeding 163 111.App.3d 1057, 517 N.E.2d 321 
(1987) (The bankruptcy of the defendant serves no useful purpose 
and would smother the message that the jury intended to send by 
their punitive damage award). 
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If punitive damages serves any purpose of punishment, the 
award in this case is overkill. A punitive damage award should 
not have the vindictive result of destroying Defendants 
financially. The jury's punitive damage award could only have 
resulted from passion and prejudice against Defendants. The 
award should be vacated and a new trial ordered that will comply 
with §78-18-1(2) and this Court's decision in Crookston. 
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POINT III 
THE VERDICT IS A PRODUCT OP PASSION AND PREJUDICE 
A. Inconsistency of Verdict and Jury Confusion, 
1. Conversion Claim. 
When the jury first returned its verdict, it found no 
conversion of partnership assets (Tr. XI:4829). However, the 
jury also "found" $512,098.00 damages "as a natural and direct 
consequence of the conversion of assets by Keith E. Garner." 
(Tr. XI:4831) When this inconsistency was drawn to the jury's 
attention the jury foreperson tried to explain the inconsistency 
but could not. (Tr. XI:4833-35) At the court's suggestion the 
jury then went back to deliberate. (Tr. XI:4835) When it 
returned in a few moments the jury had changed its answer on the 
liability question to find conversion, thereby purporting to 
justify the awarded damages. (Tr. XI:4835-37 - Add. "E") 
The only factual basis for Plaintiffs' claim of 
conversion regarded certain crypts in the indoor mausoleum that 
were allegedly converted by Garner for his own use during the 
existence of the partnership. (Complaint, 1MI 55, 56; R. 1:15) 
At trial, Mr. Garner and Susan Stewart testified that 
prior to the partnership formation Mr. Garner owned a "family 
room" of crypts valued at $75,000.00. (Tr. VIII:4342-3; 
IX:4601-09) This was shown on the inventory of unsold crypts 
furnished to Plaintiffs. (Exh. 28, p.D1100082 - App.; Cf. 
Exh. 202) Garner had decided to return the family room to the 
unsold inventory in exchange for various other individual crypts 
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in the indoor mausoleum also having a value up to $75,000.00. 
(Tr. IX:4606-08) Garner further testified that this exchange was 
reviewed with Plaintiffs in March 1988 in Hong Kong. No 
objection to the exchange was ever raised. (Tr. VIII:4342-43; 
IX:4602-3) Plaintiffs claimed the exchange was never disclosed 
to them until just before the Redemption Agreement was signed. 
(Tr. 11:3104-05) 
Ms. Stewart testified that at Alldredge1s request she 
prepared a list of crypts involved in the exchange, which 
specified those gifted and those not yet given. (Tr. IX:4616-
17, 4619; Exh. 205) 
Regardless of whether this exchange was ever approved 
by Plaintiffs, it is undisputed that Alldredge not only knew that 
Garner had transferred some of these crypts, but Alldredge had 
also confronted Garner about the matter before the Redemption 
Agreement was signed. (Tr. 11:3097-98) The release language of 
the Redemption Agreement clearly covered this matter. 
Plaintiffs1 claim for conversion and the jury's verdict 
are not supported by the evidence. Defendants have no liability 
for any alleged conversion of crypts or any other partnership 
assets. When the jury changed that answer to find liability for 
conversion, it did so without any valid basis in the evidence. 
The $512,098.00 conversion damage also is without any 
evidentiary support in the record. As noted, the only evidence 
concerning this matter was that, at most, there were one dozen 
crypts used by Garner. (Tr. 11:3099) Their value would not have 
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exceeded $48,000.00. (Tr. 11:3105) How then did the jury reach 
a figure of $512,098.00 if not by improper means of passion and 
prejudice? There was no evidence of any other partnership assets 
that Plaintiffs claimed were converted. Either this lack of 
evidence coupled with the evidence of Defendants' wealth 
impassioned and prejudiced the jury or else so sorely confused 
them that their verdict cannot stand. 
2. Fiduciary Duty Claim. 
A similar lack of material, relevant evidence defeats 
Plaintiffs1 claims for breach of fiduciary duty. Mr. Alldredge 
testified he was not given the management authority he was 
entitled to during the early months of the partnership. 
(Tr. 11:3035) Also, that when the "joint venture" was terminated 
and Defendants vacated the Mausoleum, they did not leave all the 
business records of operation. Susan Stewart testified that all 
partnership accounting information was available when Defendants 
left. (Tr. IX:4614) Plaintiffs fail to show how such can be a 
"breach of fiduciary duty." Notwithstanding any conflict of 
evidence, such evidence cannot in any way justify a claim of 
breach of a "fiduciary duty." 
More importantly, there was no evidence by which the 
jury could determine any damages for any alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty. In short, the jury could only speculate as to 
the amount of such damages, if any. Their speculation is simply 
reversible error. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 
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418-19 (Utah 1989) (reversing award for lost profits for lack of 
adequate proof of the fact of loss, causation, and the amount 
lost). 
3. "Consequential Damages" 
The jury's award of $1,165,022.00 in connection with 
the rescission as the amount necessary to put Plaintiffs back in 
their position before entering the partnership includes 
$87,860.00 as a claimed "return on investment," in addition to 
interest allegedly paid on borrowed funds. (Exh. 89 - App.) 
Plaintiffs claimed $603,472.00 in "cash advances" to operate the 
Mausoleum and $473,690.00 for interest paid by Plaintiffs on 
those cash advances and other amounts invested in the Mausoleum. 
The balance of the jury's "restitutionary" award is $87,860.00, 
the amount speculated as a "reasonable rate of return" on the 
money borrowed in the event they would have borrowed it and 
invested it elsewhere. Such an award is hardly "restitution." 
It is a vindictive windfall to Plaintiffs. 
We find no Utah authority that a party is entitled, as an 
element of rescission, to any more than what was actually paid 
and, when appropriate, interest thereon.21 We do not find any 
Utah authority that can justify a speculated return on some 
speculated investment as a part of restitution damages. 
21See Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986) (In 
rescission, the buyers are returned to the "status quo" and to 
recover the payments made on the contract, less the fair rental 
value of the premises for their time in possession.) 
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Defendants submit that this inquiry is so inherently speculative 
that it cannot support the award of $87,860.00 as 
"restitutionary" compensation. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 
781 P.2d at 418-19. 
B. The Verdict was Prejudicially Tainted by Erroneous Rulings 
and Comments by the Trial Court. 
1. Inadequate and Untimely Election of Remedies by 
Plaintiffs. 
The trial court never required Plaintiffs to elect 
either rescission or damages as their remedy. Although 
Plaintiffs finally and reluctantly purported to elect their 
remedies just prior to trial, they continued to claim rescission 
against Defendant 11th Avenue Corporation as well as the benefit 
of their bargain (e.g., "legal" damages) against Defendant 
Garner. (R. 3:1208-11) Their purported election was really no 
election at all. The trial court refused to enforce any choice 
of remedies and thereby advantaged Plaintiffs with the best of 
both worlds. 
Plaintiffs were allowed to present the opinion of an 
appraiser, Mr. Lang, that the Mausoleum had a present negative 
net worth. (Tr. VI:4063) Such evidence would be irrelevant to 
rescission, had Plaintiffs really elected that remedy. 
Plaintiffs were also able to explore various economic theories as 
fraud damage awards through such witnesses as Cramer Stiff, the 
"sales consultant," and Grant Caldwell, and trial exhibits 82 
and 90. This significant additional testimony of exploratory 
economic theories of damages undoubtedly confused the jury and 
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encouraged them to escalate the damage awards. Such evidence was 
irrelevant and inadmissible, yet Defendants1 objections thereto 
were overruled by the trial court. The court allowed Plaintiffs 
to proceed with inconsistent remedies all through the trial. 
To allow Plaintiffs to choose their remedy then ignore 
their election, and allow them to advance on both fronts, permits 
a "double recovery" and engendered the confusion and excess that 
permeates the verdict. "Election of Remedies" doctrine is 
intended to "prevent double redress for a single wrong" and 
"presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies," foregoing 
all others. Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 
603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979). 
2. Prejudicial Trial Rulings and Comments by Trial Court. 
Numerous rulings and comments, as well as the demeanor 
of the trial judge during the trial, improperly influenced the 
jury with the court's bias and predilections. Individually, each 
situation may not appear significant, but as a whole they wove a 
tight curtain between Defendants and the jurors. This fabric 
underscores the prejudicial nature of the trial court's other 
errors argued in this brief. Some of those errors, listed in the 
order of their occurrence, are: 
a. The court erred in refusing to receive as exhibits 
certain real estate listing agreements to sell the Mausoleum 
property signed by Plaintiff Alldredge in 1990-91, after his 
complaint was filed. (Proposed Exhs. 213-16) This evidence 
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showed that Plaintiffs continued to exercise dominion over the 
property and that their earlier rescission demand had been 
waived. (Tr. 111:3299-3301) 
b. The court unduly restricted Defendants' cross-
examination of Roger Evans, the Director of Building and Housing 
Services for Salt Lake City. Evans supervised the issuance of 
building permits and inspections made pursuant thereto. He 
testified on direct examination by Plaintiffs1 counsel that his 
office had voided a building permit for the outdoor garden 
pavilions in early 1987, and that such permit had not since been 
activated (Tr. IV:3485-86). The court refused to allow 
Defendants1 counsel to cross-examine as to whether the wood 
construction of the crypts was any bar to having the building 
permit renewed. The court opined that Evans was not the right 
witness to answer that question. (Tr. IV:3491-93; VIII:4441) 
c. Robert Ord, the licensed contractor engaged to 
build the outdoor garden pavilions and crypts, was not allowed to 
explain to the jury why he thought wood was an acceptable and 
appropriate building material for this construction. The court 
refused the evidence because Mr. Ord had never before built 
crypts, but then demeaned the witness and his experience and 
qualifications by adding: "Building a tree hut from wood might 
be one thing, but building crypts is quite another." 
(Tr. IV:3548) Mr. Ord's experience as a building contractor 
certainly qualified him to testify about the quality and 
durability of wood as a building material. Similarly, the court 
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demeaned the testimony of Mr. Lucero, who built the outdoor 
crypts, by stating, gratuitously: "This man is a cement worker 
or wood worker." (Tr. IV:3470-71) 
d. When Mr. Garner testified on direct examination as 
an adverse Plaintiffs1 witness, the court referred to the 
proceedings as a "three-ring circus" when Mr. Garner attempted to 
explain his answers to counsel's examination questions, and the 
court continued to interrupt Mr. Garner's answers. (Tr. V:3682, 
3688, 3691) 
e. When Defendants1 attorney objected to Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 105, a corporate tax return, the court of its own 
volition and without any prompting or prior foundation, queried 
whether "the thrust of this questioning is to establish an 
alleged under-reporting to the I.R.S.," implying to the jury that 
"multi-millionaire" Mr. Garner was also cheating the government. 
(Tr. V:3700) The court refused to receive the tax return 
(Tr. V:3701), but most certainly damaged Defendants more by the 
unrestrained comment. 
f. During cross-examination of Steven Nielson, an 
insurance agent, and Ms. Lenois, a former employee of an 
independent sales group that had sold crypts in 1984 and 1985, 
the court refused to allow Defendants to show the bias and 
prejudice of these witnesses. (Tr. V:3795-96; VI:3946) This 
unjustified abridgement impinged Defendants1 right of cross-
examination. Utah Rules of Evidence 607, 608(c); Utah Code Ann. 
§78-24-1; State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985). 
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Plaintiffs then argued to the jury in closing argument that 
Lenois and Nielson were neutral and unbiased witnesses, while 
Defendants1 opposing witnesses were all friends of Mr. Garner and 
part of his "circus of fraud." (Tr. X:4731-32, 4739, 4741, 4761, 
4764) However, when the shoe was on the other foot, the Court 
allowed Plaintiffs to pursue possible bias of Defendants' 
witnesses, even suggesting that the "credibility" of the 
witnesses was in doubt. (Tr. VIII:4317, 4359) 
g. Plaintiffs1 accountant expert was allowed to 
opine: "There's obviously legal obligations involved in 
connection with those who have purchased the dysfunctional 
crypts." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. VII:4161-62) Counsel's motion 
to strike the gratuitous characterizations was denied, suggesting 
to the jury that the trial judge agreed that the crypts were 
"dysfunctional." 
h. The trial court received in evidence Exhibits 317 
and 318, containing summaries of Mr. Garner's tax returns, filed 
jointly with his wife. The returns and the resulting summaries 
(Exhs. 317, 318 - App.) also reflected Mrs. Garner's separate 
income and assets. (Exhs. 317, 318 - App.; Tr. VII:4235-6) 
i. When defense counsel asked Dr. Schroeder, a 
professor of wood chemistry at Colorado State University, to 
explain the properties of wood and its suitability for outdoor 
garden crypts, Plaintiffs objected to the testimony as 
"immaterial." The court challenged Defendants' counsel and 
captiously asked whether he was attempting to show that "when the 
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plaintiffs bought concrete and got wood, they got a bargain? Is 
that what you are telling me?11 (Tr. VII:4258-60) Taking the 
court's cue, this "bargain" theme was later hammered home in 
Plaintiffs1 closing argument. (Tr. X:4761-62) 
j. Later during the direct examination of 
Dr. Schroeder, the court refused to allow him to describe what he 
meant when he said the wood in the crypts was "durable." 
(Tr. VII:4257-58) The court asserted that the "durable" nature 
of the wood was irrelevant, even though Defendants argued that 
Plaintiffs were required to show that the claimed 
misrepresentations were material. (Tr. VII:4257-58) Plaintiffs 
consistently attempted to suggest that wood crypts were not 
adequate. (Tr. 11:3096; VII:4097-99; X:4738-39) 
Materiality is an indispensable element of a claim of fraud 
and negligent misrepresentation. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 
1246 (Utah 1980); Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & 
Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986). Defendants were 
allowed only to proffer the remaining testimony of Dr. Schroeder 
(Tr. VII:4260; Tr. Aug. 21, 1991:4495-99), which proffer was 
rejected by the court. (Tr. IX:4707-08) 
k. The court improperly struck the testimony of 
Mr. Reaveley, a structural engineer, who explained that the 
crypts were constructed in a workmanlike manner. The court 
concluded that Mr. Reaveley1s qualifications and experience 
as a structural engineer were insufficient foundation. 
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(Tr. VII:4276-77) Such a decision far exceeded the bounds of a 
reasonable exercise of discretion. 
1. The court allowed Steve Nielson (an insurance 
agent who "toured" the Mausoleum while considering possible 
insurance coverage) to testify that Mr. Garner said the crypts 
were built like a "bunker." (Tr. V:3765, 3788) Conversely, the 
court struck "as irrelevant" the testimony of Mr. Landvatter, 
another insurance broker who was also present on the same "tour" 
as Mr. Nielson to the effect that Mr. Garner was referring to the 
older, main Mausoleum building when the statement was made. 
(Tr. VIII:4313-14) 
m. After allowing Plaintiffs1 attorney wide latitude 
in his examination of Mr. Garner, the court unduly restricted 
Mr. Garner's testimony on cross-examination and sustained 
Plaintiffs' objections. For example, in one such instance Mr. 
Garner was asked to describe how he was able to explain to 
Plaintiffs in the April 1987 tour of the premises that wood was 
an appropriate material for crypts: 
Q. [by Mr. Nielsen] Now, at that particular time, 
what was the stage of the outdoor pavilions? 
A. [Mr. Garner] They were all completed except we 
had a shortage of some 80-100 marble frontings and 
they had not been placed in the various pavilions. 
Q. What result did that have with reference to the 
observation or [of] the inside of these crypts? 
A. Well, I was able to explain to them I'd designed 
the outdoor pavilion, and that it was — made it 
appropriate to use wood in the interior for the 
housing of the coffins. 
Q. Why was that? How was that accomplished? 
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A. Well, I told [them] the building — I'd never seen 
one like this where we create a shell made out of 
reinforced concrete and steel and then put a 
Bartile roof on it, and I put a six-foot overhang 
on the one end of it and that protected the crypts 
on the inside, I called the crypts. It wasn't 
like a closed-in mausoleum. It was open. We had 
nature's air conditioning. We had fresh air. We 
had the weather. We had no electrical. And 
whenever I had seen outdoor crypts in the past, 
after a few years marble looses its luster and 
this way it would be beautiful forever, and I was 
proud of it. I still am. 
Mr. Campbell: Just a minute. Wait a minute. 
Your Honor, I object to that. This is a speech. 
We're suppose to be talking about now some — 
The Court: Non-responsive? 
Mr. Campbell: It's non-responsive. 
The Court: Objection is sustained. 
(Tr. VIII:4322-23) 
n. When Mr. James Richards, Mr. Garner's attorney in 
1989, testified that the release language of the Redemption 
Agreement was supplied by Plaintiffs' California attorney, the 
court allowed Plaintiffs' counsel to quote from court decisions 
in cross-examining Mr. Richards as to whether he was aware of 
those specific statements of Utah law at the time he helped draft 
the Redemption Agreement. The court permitted Plaintiffs1 
counsel to continue reading, even after Mr. Richards said that he 
had not specifically researched the issue of releasing claims for 
fraud. (Tr. VIII:4483-4489) 
o. Plaintiffs' attorney was permitted on cross-
examination to inquire of Mr. Funk whether he had testified for 
Mr. Garner as an expert in prior cases. (Tr. IX:4536-8) Not 
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only did counsel intend to impugn Mr. Funk's credibility as an 
expert/ but also to suggest that Mr. Garner had been a defendant 
in prior cases. However, on redirectf Defendants1 counsel was 
not permitted to ask Mr. Funk further regarding the occasions in 
which he had previously testified as an expert witness. The 
court sustained Plaintiffs' objection as "irrelevant." 
(Tr. IX:4570) 
Under similar circumstances, this Court has found 
such a ruling to be prejudicial error requiring a new trial. 
King v. Barron/ 770 P.2d 975/ 977-980 (Utah 1988). The same 
result and reasoning apply here. 
p. Dr. Burtis Evans# a prominent local physician who 
was also a friend of Mr. Garnerf testified that he had been with 
Mr. Garner and Mr. Alldredge in July 1987 at the outdoor garden 
pavilions when Mr. Alldredge was told by Mr. Garner about the 
wood crypts which Alldredge then observed. (Tr. IX:4650-55) 
During that examination, the court undermined Dr. Evans' 
credibility by several rulings and comments. (Tr. IX:4654/ 
4671-72/ 4677-78/ 4684-85) Plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to 
comment to the jury in closing argument on the court's 
"admonishments" to Dr. Evans: 
[a]nd then we have this bizarre piece of evidence from 
Burtis Evans, and I submit to you this is [a] man that 
came into this courtroom yesterday and he was going to 
set the record straight/ he was going to tell us all 
about this question. He couldn't answer a question/ no 
matter how simple it wasf I think virtually if his life 
depended on it. The Court admonished him at least a 
half a dozen times. We took twice as long examining 
because most of the time it simply was to ask him the 
same question twice. 
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(Tr. X:4745-46) 
q. Finally, the trial court's hostility toward 
Defendants, or his own confusion of the evidence, is.well 
exemplified in his Memorandum Decision denying Defendants' motion 
for new trial. The court's comments therein express the court's 
view of the evidence that cannot be supported by the record 
herein. First, the Court stated: 
Certain of Garner's assets were misrepresented at trial 
which misrepresentation was established by cross-
examination. Garner testified on direct examination 
that his wife was awarded the La Jolla, California 
residence in their 1982 divorce. When confronted with 
the original divorce file showing Garner was awarded 
the property, his original statement was retracted. 
(R. 6:2534; Add. MG") 
At trial, Mr. Garner truthfully answered that the 
La Jolla home was in his wife's name. When asked whether she 
received it in the divorce proceeding, Mr. Garner answered "I 
think it was, yes." (Tr. V:3714) Then, after a lunch break, 
Plaintiffs were allowed to recall Mr. Garner to the witness stand 
to further pursue the matter. Upon further examination 
Mr. Garner agreed that the original divorce decree had awarded 
the La Jolla home to him. (Tr. V:3734) When given an 
opportunity to explain himself, Mr. Garner testified that he had 
assumed certain liabilities in the divorce which had not 
materialized. To help even out the stipulated property division 
in the divorce, he had assigned the La Jolla home to his former 
and again current spouse, in a later property agreement. 
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(Tr. V:3736) Yet, the trial court claimed Mr. Garner's answers 
were "misrepresentations." 
r. On a subsequent page of his decision, the court 
stated that "Garner misrepresented the nature of the plywood 
crypts to everyone necessary to advance his fraud, including 
customers, insurance agents, building inspectors, his own staff, 
and his partners." (R. 6:2535 - Add. "G") The record is devoid 
of any evidence that Garner misrepresented the wood nature of the 
outdoor crypts to any customer, his own staff or building 
inspectors. The only testimony of any misrepresentation by 
Mr. Garner came from Plaintiffs and Steve Nielson. The latter 
testified that in May or June, when he saw the outdoor pavilion, 
the crypts were all covered with marble, which could not 
physically have occurred because the marble did not arrive until 
August 1987. (Tr. V:3773-74; VIII:4446) Moreover, Nielson 
acknowledged having earlier seen the wood crypt frameworks. (Tr. 
V:3794-95) 
s. The trial court continued, commenting on "the 
effect on the lives of the hundreds of crypts owners who believed 
they had purchased cement rather than plywood crypts for 
themselves and loved ones. This case presents a serious fraud on 
the public as well as Ong." (R. 6:2535-36) The only purchasers 
of outdoor crypts who may have received something different than 
what they believed were Mr. and Mrs. James Cummings. 
(Tr. VI:4023-25) They did not receive any representation from 
Mr. Garner, but learned what they did from an independent 
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salesperson in 1984, as supplemented by a letter from Sandy 
Lenois in 1985. (Tr. VI:4017-18, 4023-27; Exh. 70) Ms. Lenois 
likewise did not get her information from Mr. Garner. (Tr. 
VI:3939-40) For that reason, Defendants had earlier filed a 
motion in limine to exclude such testimony (R. 2:830-43) which 
was denied. (R. 4:1398) In any event/ two people are not 
"hundreds." Dr. Kovalenko and his wife, both crypt purchasers, 
were told they were getting crypts to be constructed of wood 
before they were even built and later saw the wood crypts during 
their construction. (Tr. VIII:4387-88) 
There is no evidence that any crypt purchaser was 
ever prevented from similarly viewing the crypts during the 
course of construction, even if any original explanation of the 
crypts' nature at the time of purchase was ambiguous, which the 
evidence did not show. The court's hostility to Defendants was 
just as readily apparent to the jury during the trial as it is 
apparent in the hyperbole of the Memorandum Decision. (Add. "G" 
- R. 6:2532-38) 
The trial court allowed itself to be taken in by 
Plaintiffs' abundant innuendo. The court's jaundiced view was 
undoubtedly a significant factor in its rulings and in the jury's 
perception of those rulings. Such rulings, collectively if not 
individually, could only have influenced the jury against 
Defendants, notwithstanding a jury instruction that the jurors 
were the "sole judge of the facts." (Jury Instr. 3; R. 5:1795) 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT IMPROPERLY AWARDS 
PLAINTIFFS1 LITIGATION EXPENSES WHICH ARE NOT TAXABLE COSTS 
A trial court abuses its discretion when it awards as costs 
expenses which are not allowed by statute, rulef or case law, no 
matter what the necessity was for such expense• Frampton v, 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). Most recently, in Cornish Town 
v. Keller, 817 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1991), this Court held that 
such necessary trial expenses as the cost of photographic 
exhibits, maps, and pre-trial hearing transcripts are not costs 
to be awarded to a prevailing party. Accord Kerr v. Kerr, 
610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980) (Expert witness fees may not be 
taxed above the statutory rate). 
In a "Supplemental Judgment" entered January 2, 1992, the 
trial judge awarded Plaintiffs "costs" of $12,260.00, which 
included deposition costs of $11,503.00, witness fees of $631.75, 
and Plaintiffs1 $125.00 filing fee. (Cost Judgment, Add. "K") A 
significant portion of the cost award is allocated to 
"depositions" which Plaintiffs claimed were necessary for trial. 
However, under Frampton, deposition costs must be both (1) "taken 
in good faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appear to 
be essential for the development and presentation of the case," 
and (2) said depositions must also "relate to the examination of 
witnesses whose testimony is deemed essential to the trial, and 
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taken for potential uses testimony in the trial, . . . " 
Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774.22 
In this case, a total of 43 people were deposed by both 
sides prior to trial. The court awarded Plaintiffs their 
expenses for every one of the depositions taken. At trial, 
Plaintiffs only called eight witnesses who were deposed at the 
Plaintiffs1 request. (R. 6:2302, 117 - Add. "J") The depositions 
of three of those witnesses, Roger Evans, Steve Nielson and 
Sandra Lenois, were not at all necessary because Plaintiffs had 
already interviewed those witnesses prior to their depositions. 
The cost of these three depositions was $921.95. 
As to the remaining five witnesses, Plaintiffs did not 
establish the essential use of those depositions at trial. Four 
of the remaining five were noticed for deposition even before 
Plaintiffs served their first set of interrogatories. (R. 
6:2293-99 - App. "J") The cost of these four depositions was 
almost $2,000.00. (R. 6:2302, 11 7b - Add. "J") 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to the expenses of taking 
depositions where they could have first sought what information 
^
z
 See also Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 
639 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984); Stratford v. Wood, 
11 Utah 2d 251, 253, 358 P.2d 80, 81 (1961) (Survey costs in 
preparation of trial are not recoverable); Morgan v. Morgan, 
795 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Utah App. 1990) (Witness fees, travel 
expenses and service of process expenses are chargeable only in 
accordance with statutory fee schedules); Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1124 (Utah App. 1989) 
(Expert witness fees are not recoverable costs); Lloyd* s 
Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 
(Utah App. 1988) (The costs for depositions not used at trial are 
not recoverable); Hatanaka v. K.E. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1055 
(Utah App. 1987) (Survey costs are not recoverable). 
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they needed by way of other less expensive discovery request. 
Highland Constr. Co., 639 P.2d at 1051. 
Plaintiffs requested and were granted costs of taking 14 
depositions by them when the witness never testified in court, 
nor was the deposition used (R. 6:2302; Add. "J," 11 5) These 
costs amounted to $3,480.35. It was a clear abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to award Plaintiffs their deposition costs, 
as it did, for every person deposed by either side. The award of 
deposition costs should be vacated. 
The trial court also allowed $631.75 in witness fees. 
(R. 7:6496; Add. "K") At least 21 of the witness fees paid by 
Plaintiffs exceeded the statutory rate of Utah Code Ann. §21-5-4 
(1990). (R. 5:2078-79 - Add. "I") The court also awarded 
witness fees paid to ensure a deponents attendance at his or her 
deposition. A great many of these subpoena fees were not 
necessary, nor were the depositions, either because Plaintiffs 
had interviewed the witnesses before deposing them, because the 
witnesses would have appeared without subpoena and witness fee, 
or because the witnesses were never called to testify at trial. 
It is insufficient merely to cry that "oh, we might have had to 
use the deposition at trial had the witness not then appeared." 
As a matter of fact, they did not use the depositions "as 
testimony." Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774; see also Defendants' 
Memorandum Objecting to the Witness Fees, R. 6:2271-77. 
Obviously the trial court did not properly scrutinize the 
costs Plaintiffs claimed. The court abused its discretion in not 
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more cautiously and judiciously examining the itemization of 
Plaintiffs' litigation expenses to eliminate all but those 
compensable under Utah law. The award of witness fees should be 
vacated, and if Plaintiffs are entitled to any costs whatever, 
they should receive only the costs in accordance with Rule 54(d) 
and the cases cited herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the release language of the Redemption Agreement was 
fairly negotiated at arms-length with the assistance of legal 
counsel, and it is clear and comprehensive enough to bar all of 
Plaintiffs1 claims, the judgments entered below should be vacated 
and reversed, with an instruction to the trial court to dismiss 
all of Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. 
Alternatively, for any or all of the reasons specified, the 
judgments entered below should be reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial with instructions to bifurcate the issue of 
punitive damages as required by law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this XH^ day of April, 1992. 
/yUtX^-
R. Nielsen 
OF-tfENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
185 South State Street, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ffttrr H. Nielsen 
Gary A. Weston 
John K. Mangum 
Of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of April, 1992, I 
served upon Plaintiffs/Appellees four true and correct 
replacement copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS with 
attached Addendum by causing the same to be hand-delivered to the 
following: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq. 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
13th Floor, One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
CwtOM AAA^V"— 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr, Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST CO. 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, NJ 07044 
RE: DELIVERY OF STOCK CERTIFICATES AND ESCROW ACCOUNT 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
Pursuant to the ten (10) enclosed opinion letters for Mssrs. 
Goldberg; Hammond; Jacobson; Lake;, Lieberman; Mauro; Pagano; 
Rinaldi; Rosenthal; and Zipern (the "Shareholders"), I will inform 
you that the share certificates you issued to the Shareholders will 
be delivered to my escrow account. As soon as the shares 
represented by the share certificates are sold, Mr. Yagi will 
arrange for payment therefor in the amount of thirty-five thousand 
dollars ($35,000). 
Your cooperation is assisting the Shareholders is greatly 
appreciated. 
Very truly yours, 
William R„ Shupe 
WRS/bk 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Bernard 
C. Zipern; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Bernard C. Zipern (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Bernard C. Zipern which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares, The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Zipern's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Zipernfs immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Zipern paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Zipern is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Zipern on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr-. Zipern in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Zipern's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Zipernfs immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Zipern is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Zipern's holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\nj trns fr.op2 3.9) 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Seymour 
Rosenthal; Number of Shares held: 44,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Seymour Rosenthal (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Seymour Rosenthal which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Rosenthal's knowledge, no members 
of Mr. Rosenthal's immediate family or others have sold any 
shares of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Rosenthal paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Rosenthal is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Rosenthal on 
July 25, 1985, and have been held b£ Mr. Rosenthal in excess of 
three (3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Rosenthal's knowledge, no members 
of Mr. Rosenthalfs immediate family or others have sold any 
shares of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr- Rosenthal is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Rosenthal's holding of the Shares 
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R, Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9) 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Frank 
Rinaldi; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr, Frank Rinaldi (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Frank Rinaldi which are relevant 
to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The following 
representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Rinaldifs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Rinaldifs immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Rinaldi paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Rinaldi is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Rinaldi on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr.* Rinaldi in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Rinaldi fs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Rinaldifs immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Rinaldi is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Rinaldi's holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
WRS/bk 
William R. Shupe 
(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9) 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Frank X. 
Pagano; Number of Shares held: 55/000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr- Frank X- Pagano (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Frank X. Pagano which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares, The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Paganofs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Paganofs immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr- Pagano paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Pagano is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Pagano on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr*. Pagano in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Pagano's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Pagano's immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Pagano is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Paganofs holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9) 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr, Salvatore 
Mauro; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company") , you have requested our opinion (this ,lOpinionn) as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Salvatore Mauro (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Salvatore Mauro which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Maurofs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Maurofs immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90)' days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Mauro paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Mauro is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Mauro on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Mauro in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Mauro1 s knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Mauro1s immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Mauro is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Mauro's holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Daniel L. 
Liberman; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Daniel L. Liberman (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Daniel L. Liberman which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Liberman1 s knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Liberman1s immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Liberman paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Liberman is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Liberman on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr.-Liberman in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Liberman's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Liberman1s immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Liberman is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr, Liberman's holding of the Shares 
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Walter J. 
Lake, Sr.; Number of Shares held: 46,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Walter J. Lake, Sr. (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Walter J. Lake, Sr. which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Lake's knowledge, no members of Mr. 
Lakefs immediate family or others have sold any shares of the 
Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr- Lake paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 1985, 
and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date free 
and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present time; 
and 
7. That Mr. Lake is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Lake on July 25, 
1985, and have been held by Mr. Lake in excess of three (3) 
years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Lake's knowledge, no members of Mr. 
Lake's immediate family or others have sold any shares of the 
Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently onemillion 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. Tha4: Mr, Lake is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr, Lake's holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3,9) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Marc 
Jacobson; Number of Shares held: 50,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Marc Jacobson (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Marc Jacobson which are relevant 
to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The following 
representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Jacobson!s knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Jacobsonfs immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Jacobson paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Jacobson is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Jacobson on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. 'Jacobson in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Jacobson's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Jacobson's immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8, That Mr. Jacobson is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Jacobson's holding of the Shares 
meets the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9) 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr- Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr, Richard 
Hammond; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr- Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Richard Hammond (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 193 3. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Richard Hammond which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Hammond's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Hammond's immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Hammond paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Hammond is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Hammond on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Hammond in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Hammondfs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Hammondfs immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Hammond is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Hammond's holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
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March 21, 1989 
Mr, Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Harvey M. 
Goldberg; Number of Shares held: 46,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this ••Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Harvey M. Goldberg (the 
'•Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 193 3. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Harvey M. Goldberg which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Goldberg's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Goldberg's immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr, Goldberg paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7 . That Mr. Goldberg is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Goldberg on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Goldberg in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ; 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Goldbergfs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Goldberg's immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Hyman Manger 
New Jersey Transfer 
March 21, 1989 
Page 3 
8. ThaJ; Mr. Goldberg is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Goldberg's holding of the Shares 
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
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ADDENDUM 
Record Reference 
Complaint R. 1:2-18 
Plaintiffs1 Notice of Election of Remedies R. 3:1208-11 
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Opposition to Plaintiffs' Notice of 
Election of Remedies R. 3:1288-99 
Minute Entry Ruling Denying Defendants' 
Objection to Election of Remedies and 
Defendants' Motions in Limine R. 4:1398 
Transcript of Reading of Jury Verdict and 
Court's Instructions regarding 
Inconsistencies Tr. XI:4826-37 
Judgment of Rescission on Special Verdict of 
the Jury (including findings of Jury Verdict) R. 5:1923-36 
Memorandum Decision (Denying Defendants' Post-
Verdict Motions) R. 6:2532-38 
Supplemental Judgment R. 5:2165-67 
Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs R. 5:2073-84 
Defendants' Exhibits Pertaining to Cost 
Award R. 6:2267f 2287-2302 
Order and Judgment (Awarding Costs) R. 7:6495-97 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) 
INC, a Nevada corporation; 
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah 
corporation; and DAVID L. 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a 
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; 




(Demand for Jury Trial) 
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Plaintiffs claim against the Defendants and for causes of j 
action allege: 
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PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc. ("Ong, Inc.") 
is a Nevada corporation doing business in Salt Lake County, State ! 
of Utah. ! 
2. Plaintiff D&D Management ("D&D") is a Utah corporation * 
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. | 
3. Plaintiff David L. Alldredge ("Alldredge") is a resident j 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is an officer, director ; 
and shareholder of D&D, and an officer of Ong, Inc. j 
4. Defendant 11th Avenue Corporation is a Utah corporation, ! 
formerly known as Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum ( "SLMM") , with its j 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, j 
5. Defendant Keith E. Garner ("Garner") is a resident of j 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is or was an officer, \ 
director or shareholder of SLMM. 
6. Garner is the alter ego of SLMM and vice versa. 
7. Subject matter jurisdiction of this action is present I 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1). This Court has in ! 
i 
personam jurisdiction. j 
8. Venue is properly laid in this Court pursuant to Utah j 
Code Ann. § 78-13-1, 4 and 7. I 
210409B.PL2 I 
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BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS 
The Construction of the Mausoleum Pavilion 
9. From at least 1984 through May 13, 1988, SLMM or its 
predecessor-in-interest, Utah Memorial Park Mausoleum 
(collectively "SLMM"), operated and conducted a mausoleum 
business located at 1001 East 11th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The business included entombment services in the mausoleum 
located at that address as well as crematory services. 
10. On or about April 30f 1984, SLMM, by and through its 
agent, Arnold Fluckiger ("Fluckiger"), filed a Request for 
Variance from the Terms of the Zoning Ordinance (the "Request") 
with the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, Utah, for the 
construction of an outdoor garden mausoleum pavilion consisting 
of five pods of concrete crypts containing 102 crypts per pod or 
a total of 510 crypts (the "Pavilion"). Fluckiger was also the 
architect retained by SLMM to design the Pavilion. SLMM 
represented in the documents and building plans submitted with 
the Request that the individual crypts of the Pavilion would be 
constructed of concrete. 
11. On or about May 14, 1984, the Board of Adjustment 
granted the Request. 
12. The Findings and Order of the Board of Adjustment 
specifically require that the construction plans conform to the 
210409B.PL2 
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requirements of the Uniform Building Code and all other Salt Lake 
City ordinances applicable thereto and that SLMM comply with all 
conditions imposed by the Board before a certificate of occupancy 
or final inspection certificate would be issued. 
13. On or about July 10, 1984, SLMM, by and through its 
agent, Robert M. Ord ("Ord"), filed a Building Permit Application 
(the "Application") with the Building and Housing Services 
Department of Salt Lake City Corporation (the "Building 
Department"), for the construction of the Pavilion. Ord was also 
the general contractor retained by SLMM to construct the 
Pavilion. SLMM represented in the documents and building plans 
submitted with the Application that the individual crypts of the 
Pavilion would be constructed of concrete. 
14. On or about July 10, 1984, the Building Department 
approved the Application and issued SLMM Building Permit No. 
30641 for the construction of the Pavilion. 
15. Construction of the Pavilion commenced in or about 
August, 1984, but was not completed until sometime in 
approximately 1987. 
16. On or about September 4, 1986, a Salt Lake City building 
inspector inspected the construction of the Pavilion and cited 
SLMM for a violation for the reason that individual crypts in the 
Pavilion were constructed of wood rather than pre-fabricated or 
210409B.PL2 ,*<^r\r~ 
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) 
poured-in-place concrete as required by the zoning variance, the 
building permit and the construction plans. The citation 
required that SLMM obtain the approval of the Salt Lake 
City/County Board of Health for the construction and proposed use 
of wooden crypts before a certificate of occupancy or final 
inspection certificate would be issued. 
17. On or about September 4, 1986, the building inspector 
filed a complaint with the Salt Lake City/County Board of Health 
alleging that SLMM's construction and proposed use of wooden 
crypts was in violation of the ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
18. On or about January 9, 1987, the building inspector 
revoked the building permit previously issued, due in part to the 
fact that SLMM had not received approval from the Board of Health 
for the construction and proposed use of wooden crypts. 
19. Contrary to ordinances of Salt Lake City and the law, 
SLMM and Garner or their agents, including Fluckiger and Ord, 
subsequently completed construction of the Pavilion with crypts 
constructed of either (1) all concrete, (2) all wood, or (3) 
horizontal concrete surfaces and vertical wood surfaces. 
20. Salt Lake City has not issued a certificate of occupancy 
or a final building inspection certificate relative to the 
construction of the Pavilion. The building permit initially 
issued for the construction of the Pavilion is void. 
210409B.PL2 
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21. Standards and practices in the mausoleum and crypt 
construction industry dictate that crypts be constructed of 
concrete, steel, stone or other materials not subject to decay 
or leakage of corrosive materials or fluids. Said standards and 
practices preclude crypts being constructed in whole or in part 
of wood. 
The Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum General Partnership Agreement 
22. On May 13, 1988, SLMM, Ong, Inc. and D&D entered into 
a general partnership (the "Partnership") as memorialized in the 
Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum General Partnership Agreement (the 
"Partnership Agreement"). 
23. The purpose of the Partnership was and is to operate, 
develop, manage and conduct the business presently known as the 
Salt Lake Mausoleum and Memorial Park. 
24. Pursuant to the Partnership Agreement, Ong, Inc. made 
an initial capital contribution of $800,000.00 to the 
Partnership. SLMM contributed certain assets and liabilities 
having an assigned net value of $875,000.00. The assets and 
liabilities contributed by SLMM were the business assets and real 
property used in the mausoleum business including the Pavilion. 
The Partnership Redemption Agreement. 
25. On or about February 28, 1989, the Partnership, SLMM, 
Ong, Inc., D&D, Alldredge and Garner entered into a Partnership 
210409B.PL2 . ^  *-VV>M 
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Redemption Agreement (the "Redemption Agreement"). 26. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Redemption Agreement, including the 
specific representations and warranties of SLMM and Garner as 
specified in paragraph 12 thereof, the Partnership purchased 
SLMM's interest in the Partnership for $440,220. 
27. Subsequent to the parties entering into the Redemption 
Agreement, Ong, Inc. has been required to make additional capital 
contributions to the Partnership in excess of $500,000 to fund 
obligations of the Partnership. 
REPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS 
28. During the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement and 
the Redemption Agreement and as material inducements to the 
Plaintiffs to enter into such Agreements, SLMM and Garner 
represented to the Plaintiffs the following: 
(a) The individual crypts in the Pavilion were of 
standard concrete construction, the same standard concrete 
construction as the "model crypt" in the indoor mausoleum of the 
Partnership as shown to the Plaintiffs and potential third party 
purchasers; 
(b) The individual crypts in the Pavilion were 
constructed as required by industry standards and practices; 
210409B.PL2 
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(c) The individual crypts in the Pavilion were 
constructed as required by the zoning, building, health and other j 
applicable ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
(d) SLMM and Garner were in the process of negotiating 
with Salt Lake County to reduce SLMM's real property tax 
liability in the amount of $38,000.00. 
29. Each of the representations made by SLMM and Garner as 
described in the preceding paragraph were false in that: 
(a) Substantially all of the crypts in the Pavilion are 
constructed entirely or substantially of wood. 
(b) Industry standards and practices for the 
construction of mausoleum crypts require that the individual 
crypts be constructed of concrete, steel, stone or other 
materials not subject to decay or to leakage of corrosive 
materials or fluids. 
(c) The construction of the Pavilion is in violation 
of the zoning, building, health and other applicable ordinances 
of Salt Lake City. 
(d) SLMM and Garner were not in the process of 
conducting and did not subsequently conduct any negotiations with 
Salt Lake County which resulted in a reduction of SLMM's real 
property tax liability. The Partnership was required to pay Salt 
210409B.PL2 
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Lake County taxes, penalties and interest in the amount of 
approximately $63f000.00. 
30. During the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement and \ 
the Redemption Agreement and as material inducements to the i 
Plaintiffs to enter into such Agreement, SLMM and Garner omitted \ 
and otherwise failed to disclose to the Plaintiffs the following: i 
(a) The building permit for the construction of the | 
Pavilion had been revokedf the Certificate of Occupancy had not ; 
been issued and Board of Health approval for the use of wooden j 
crypts had not been obtained. j 
(b) Substantially all of the crypts in the Pavilion j 
i 
were constructed entirely or substantially of wood. | 
(c) The construction of wooden crypts is precluded by ! 
and in violation of industry standards and practices. 
(d) The construction and proposed use of wooden crypts j 
is in violation of the zoning, building, health and other 
applicable ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
31. SLMM and Garner have never disclosed to the Plaintiffs 
the facts alleged in the preceding paragraph, concealed such j 
facts from the Plaintiffs and knew individual crypts in the j 
Pavilion were not readily available for inspection by the I 
Plaintiffs. j 
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(Predicated On Constructive Fraud) I 
32. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference j 
paragraphs 1 through 31, inclusive, of the Complaint. j 
33. During the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement and ; 
the Redemption Agreement, SLMM and Garner owed a fiduciary duty j 
to the Plaintiffs and had a duty of good faith, fairness and j 
honesty in dealing with the Plaintiffs due to the confidential j 
relationship between the parties. 
34. As a general partner of the Partnership, SLMM owed a j 
fiduciary duty to Ong, Inc. and D&D. As the alter ego of SLMM, 
Garner owed a fiduciary duty to Ong, Inc. and D&D. 
35. The representations of SLMM and Garner as alleged in 
paragraph 28 and the failure to disclose facts as alleged in 
paragraph 30 (hereinafter collectively the "Representations") 
concerned presently existing facts. 
36. The Representations were material to the Plaintiffs 
relative to their respective decisions to enter into the 
Partnership Agreement and/or the Redemption Agreement. 
37. The Representations were false or constituted an 
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statements madef in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. 
38. SLMM and Garner made the Representations for the purpose 
of inducing the Plaintiffs to rely and act upon them and enter 
into the Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement. 
39. The Plaintiffs acted reasonably and in ignorance of the 
falsity of the Representations. 
40. The Plaintiffs did, in fact, rely upon the 
Representations to their detriment and were thereby induced to 
enter into the Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement 
to their injury and damage. 
41. The Partnership Agreement, the Redemption Agreement and 
all ancillary agreements, releases, and waivers incident thereto, 
are null, void and are of no force and effect whatever by reason 
of Defendants' breach of fiduciary duties, misrepresentations and 
omissions as aforesaid. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
COUNT II 
RESCISSION 
(Predicated On Frauds 
42. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 41, inclusive, of the Complaint. 
210409B.PL2 
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43. SLMM and Garner acted with scienter by intentionally 
making the Representations knowing that the Representations were 
false, or recklessly making the Representations knowing that they 
had insufficient knowledge upon which to base the 
Representations. 
44. The Plaintiffs did, in fact, reasonably rely upon the 
Representations to their detriment and were thereby induced to 
enter into the Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement 
to their injury and damage. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
COUNT III 
RESCISSION 
(Predicated On Negligent Misrepresentation) 
45. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 44, inclusive, of the Complaint. 
46. SLMM and Garner had a duty to use reasonable diligence 
and competence in ascertaining the veracity of the 
Representations. 
47. SLMM and Garner breached their duty by making the 
Representations to the Plaintiffs without having used reasonable 
diligence or competence in ascertaining the veracity of the 
Representations. 
210409B.PL2 
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48. The Plaintiffs did, in fact, rely upon the 
Representations to their detriment and were thereby induced to 
enter into the Partnership Agreement and Redemption Agreement to 
their injury and damage. 
49. The injury and damage suffered by Plaintiffs were 
proximately caused by the breach of SLMM and Garner of said duty. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
COUNT IV 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
50. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 49, inclusive, of the Complaint. 
51. SLMM and Garner breached their fiduciary duty by 
misrepresenting material existing facts and failing to disclose 
material existing facts as alleged herein. 
52. The Plaintiffs did, in fact, rely upon the 
Representations to their detriment and were thereby induced to 
enter into the Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement 
to their injury and damage. 
53. The injury and damage suffered by Plaintiffs was 
proximately caused by the breach of SLMM and Garner of said duty. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
210409B.PL2 -mm 
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COUNT V 
CONVERSION 
54. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 53, inclusive, of the Complaint 
55. During the term of the Partnership, SLMM and Garner 
conveyed and transferred ownership of certain crypts to Garner 
and approximately 12 third parties, for which the Partnership 
received no consideration. 
56. Neither the Partnership, Ong, Inc. nor D&D knew of or 
authorized said actions of SLMM or Garner in conveying and 
transferring said crypts. 
57. The actions of SLMM and Garner as alleged in paragraphs 
54 through 55 were intentional. 
58. The actions of SLMM and Garner as alleged in paragraphs 
54 through 55 have damaged the Plaintiffs in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
COUNT VI 
INDEMNIFICATION 
59. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 58, inclusive, of the Complaint. 
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60 • Pursuant to the terms of the Redemption Agreement, SLMM 
agreed to indemnify the Partnership from all demands, 
liabilities, losses, damages including attorneys' fees and costs 
which the Partnership may sustain by virtue of acts which were 
done or omitted to be done by SLMM, prior to the date of the 
Redemption Agreement. 
61. SLMM and Garner knew or should have known that the 
Partnership would sell and market crypts in the Pavilion to the 
general public. 
62. SLMM and Garner knew or should have known that when it 
was discovered by purchasers of crypts in the Pavilion that the 
crypts were constructed of wood and in violation of the zoning, 
building, health and other applicable ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, claims would be made against the Partnership and the 
Plaintiffs relative thereto. 
63. On information and belief such claims will be made for 
which indemnification is sought. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
210409B.PL2 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Plaintiffs pray for the following relief: 
1. On Counts I, II, and III, for rescission of the i 
Partnership Agreement, the Redemption Agreement and all ancillary 
agreements, releases, and waivers incident thereto, and for 
restoration of Plaintiffs to their status quo prior to entering ; 
into the Agreements, including judgment against the Defendants j 
for damages in an amount to be proven at trial to fully and 
completely restore Plaintiffs to their status quo ante. 
2. In the alternative, on Counts I through VI inclusive, 
for an award of compensatory damages in an amount to be proven 
at trial but not less than $2.5 Million Dollars. j 
I 
3. On all Counts, for indemnification of the Plaintiffs by 
the Defendants from any claim, demand, cause of action or ! 
i 
liability as the result of Plaintiffs' involvement in or I 
ownership of the Partnership or the mausoleum business conducted j 
by the Partnership, including the sale of crypts in the Pavilion, j 
i 
4. For punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial I 
of not less than $5 Million Dollars. ! 
I 
5. For reasonable attorney's fees and costs in prosecuting j 
I 
this action as proven at trial for all counts and causes of j 
action. j 
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6. For such further and additional relief as the Court 
deems equitable in the premises. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury of all issues triable of right, 
common law and the Utah Constitution. 
DATED this jlsft day of July, 1990. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
S^Z?^ 
ROBERTAS. CAMPBELL ^ ^ 
CLSRK W. SESSIONS^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiff's Address: 
1001 East 11th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) 
INC, a Nevada corporation; 
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah 
corporation; and DAVID L. 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a 
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; 
KEITH E. GARNER, an 
individual; 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF 
ELECTION OF REMEDIES 
Civil No. 900904288CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record herewith 
give Notice to the Defendants of their determination with regard 
to remedies as to each of the Defendants. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
* 
The Plaintiffs Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc., D & D 
Management, Inc., and David L. Alldredge herewith elect their 
remedies against the Defendants as follows: 
1. Against Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum, now called 11th 
Avenue Corporation, or against its alter-ego Keith E. Garner for 
rescission, consequential damages and punitive damages in 
accordance with the law of the case arising out of fraudulent 
misrepresentations of the Defendants; 
2. Against Keith E. Garner, an individual, and inducer of 
the fraudulent misrepresentations for fraud, for direct benefit 
of the bargain damages, consequential damages and punitive 
damages; 
3. Against Keith E. Garner and 11th Avenue Corporation for 
breach of fiduciary duties in the performance of the partnership, 
the damages thereof being the reasonable and natural injuries 
that are foreseeable arising from said breaches; 
4. Against Keith E. Garner for conversion, embezzlement 
and misappropriation of partnership assets and properties, the 
damages being the fair market value of said assets to the 
partnership together with punitive damages. 
5. Although not a matter of remedies, against the 
Defendants Keith E. Garner and/or 11th Avenue Corporation, for 
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recovery . -easonable attorneys fees and costs as to each of the 
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DATED this 4**" day of August, 1991. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
CLARK W. SESSIONS _ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the c$~7% day of August, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF 
ELECTION OF REMEDIES was hand-delivered to: 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. 
Gary A. Weston, Esq. 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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) 
Arthur H. Nielsen, USB No. A2405 
Gary A. Weston, USB No. 3435 
Richard M. Hymas, USB No. 1612 
John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple ;• 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SA 
STATE OF UTAH 
Thir0<Jycliciai District 
- 6 r..r:i 
LAKE COUNTY 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) ) 
INC., a Nevada corporation; !>&; 
MANAGEMENT, a Utah corporatir-
and DAVID L. ALLDREDGE, an 
individual, 
Plaint i i; ;._, 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, a til ai 
corporation, fka SALT LAKE 
MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; and KEITH 
E. GARNER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS1 OBJECTION AND 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS1 NOTICE OF 
ELECTION OF REMEDIES 
Civil No 900904288CN 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
B Relevant Business Dealings Between the Parties 
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) 
Mausoleum [lfSLMMM ], operated and conducted a mausoleum business 
at 1001 East 11th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant Keith 
E. Garner ["Garner"] isf and at all relevant times wasf an 
officer, a director, and a shareholder of SLMM. [Complaint at 
119.] 
On May 13, 1988, SLMM, Plaintiff Ong International (U.S.A.), 
Inc. ["Ong, Inc."], and Plaintiff D&D Management ["D&D"] entered 
into a general partnership [the "Partnership"] as memorialized in 
the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum General Partnership Agreement 
[the "Partnership Agreement"]. The purpose of the Partnership 
was to operate, develop, manage and conduct the mausoleum 
business. [Complaint at if if 22-23.] 
On or about February 28, 1989, the Partnership, SLMM, Ong, 
Inc., D&D, Plaintiff David L. Alldredge ["Alldredge"] and Garner 
entered into a Partnership Redemption Agreement [the "Redemption 
Agreement"]. Alldredge is an officer, director and owner of D&D, 
and an officer of Ong, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of the 
Redemption Agreement, the Partnership purchased SLMM's interest 
in the Partnership. [Complaint at 1fIf 3, 25-26.] 
B. Nature of the Lawsuit 
On July 25, 1990, Plaintiffs commenced this action against 
Defendants. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Garner is 
the alter ego of SLMM, and vice versa. [Complaint at 116.] They 
further allege that SLMM and Garner made false representations, 
and failed to make complete disclosure, regarding the materials 
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1. Claims for Relief 
a g 
Pi a : 
a I n s t 1. 
Cour 








Rescission predicates uii alleged constructive 
fraud. 
Rescissio 1 1 p 1:edicate * JU diiegeci t: -
Rescission predicate; <~m a]ipqec .--^ 1 igent 
misrepresentation. 
Breach o1 fiduciary d 1 11 y 
Convers ion 
Incienin 1 I 1 < ,it 11 HI 
Th^ f.= t; four counts of; Plaintiffs 1 complaint based 
upoi i the alleged representations and omissions referred tu above. 
2m Prayer for Rel ief 
Plaintiffs' P r a y e r f o r R e I i e f seeks, in f M I f , i he? following 
relief: 
1. On Counts 1/ II, and III, for rescission of 
the Partnership Agreement, the Redemption Agreement and 
all ancillary agreements, released, and waivers 
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) 
incident thereto, and for resoration of Plaintiffs to 
their status quo prior to entering into the Agreements, 
including judgment against the Defendants for damages 
in an amount to be proven at trial to fully and 
completely restore Plaintiffs to their status quo ante. 
2. In the alternative, on Counts I through VI 
inclusive, for an award of compensatory damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial but not less than $2.5 
Million Dollars. 
C. Order Requiring Defendants To Make Election Of Remedies 
At the pre-trial conference held on July 29, 1991, the Court 
ordered Plaintiffs to make and give notice to Defendants of their 
election of remedies. On August 5, 1991, Defendants received 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Election of Remedies, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
The Plaintiffs Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc., 
D&D Management, Inc., and David L. Alldredge herewith 
elect their remedies against the Defendants as follows: 
1. Against Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum, now 
called 11th Avenue Corporation, or against its alter-
ego Keith E. Garner for rescission, consequential 
damages and punitive damages in accordance with the law 
of the case arising out of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions of the Defendants; 
2. Against Keith E. Garner, an individual, and 
inducer of the fraudulent misrepresentations for fraud, 
for direct benefit of the bargain damages, consequen-
tial damages and punitive damages; 
3. Against Keith E. Garner and 11th Avenue 
Corporation for breach of fiduciary duties in the 
performance of the partnership, the damages thereof 
being the reasonable and natural injuries that are 
foreseeable arising from said breaches; 
[Emphasis added.] 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED PROPERLY 
ELECT THEIR REMEDIES WHERE THEIR NOTICE 
SETS FORTH AN INTENT TO PORSOE THE INCONSISTENT 
REMEDIES OF RESCISSION AND DAMAGES 
procedure . arpose \ c \. T • , M-> • -n- t-oouri-r * jn- remedy, 
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F i r ^ i i n t e r s t a t e Bank of Utah , <•• ^ 
Royal R e s o u r c e s , I n c . v . G i b r a l t e r F i n a n c i a l Corp, : 
796 ( U t a h i ^ / ^ . n e u u c t r i • 
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;^jvdi R e s o u r c e s , I n c . v . G i b r a l t e r 
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I-) i i " i p I e"' f pa r t- v from 
recovering mc M * •«:< * the same loss. Brigham City Sand & 
Gravel /. Machines Center, Inc., o u r.zi 
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; 
Plaintiffs1 Notice of Election of Remedies indicates that 
Plaintiffs have elected to pursue the remedy of rescission 
against SLMM and Garner. It also indicates that Plaintiffs seek 
to recover damages against Garner for fraud and for breach of 
fiduciary duty. The election by Plaintiffs of two alternative 
and inconsistent remedies—rescission and damages—is not an 
appropriate or adequate election of remedies. 
It is well-established that the remedies of rescission and 
damages for fraud are inconsistent. Gentemann v. Sunaire 
Systems, 665 P.2d 875, 877 (Or.App. 1983). Rescission, on the 
one hand, is a restitutionary remedy which attempts to restore 
the parties to the status quo to the extent possible or as 
demanded by the equities in the case. Dugan v. Jones, 724 P. 2d 
955, 957 (Utah 1986); Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 
716, 731 (Utah App. 1990). On the other hand, damages in an 
action for fraud are determined under the "benefit of the 
bargain" rule, which provides for damages in an amount equal to 
the difference between the value of :he property purchased and 
the value it would have had if the representations were true. 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). 
1Damages for breach of fiduciary duty, like damages for 
fraud, are not designed to restore a plaintiff to the status quo, 
but instead attempt to compensate the plaintiff for the damages 
which proximately result from the defendant's tortious conduct. 
Such damages are inconsistent with the remedy of rescission, and, 
where rescission is sought, are precluded under the doctrine of 
election of remedies. 
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I I 
p L A I N T I F F S , MAY N Q T S E E R T Q RECOVER "BENEFIT OF 
THE BARGAIN" DAMAGES FROM GARNER WHERE THEY 
HAVE ELECTED RESCISSION AS THEIR REMEDY, 
EVEN THOUGH, IF SLMM IS HELD LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS, 
GARNER MAY BE REQUIRED TO SATISFY SLMM'S OBLIGATION 
TO RESTORE PLAINTIFFS TO THE STATUS QUO 
PI ai nti ffs argue that evei i thouqh i hey seek * 
judqiiiei it • :: £ rescission agai nst SLMM, \.he doctrine oi •_ . < ^  .^ 
remedies does i lot prevent them from seeking * - f ecover "damages" 
against bdint 
statements *-n _:_.- _w ., owever, ai 
"damages" whic\ : a^  :*e mposen i., ndice? )t *-• ^ a u r 
, II M I ! » ' - -« * .
 t. 
damage^ proximately caused . *^ru .:? ••!:n<ni, f . at!-r 
the amounts of restitution which the corporation is unable L U 
pay. 
I n Meredith v . Ramsdell , 18*1 P, 2d 94 1  ( r n l n , ! 9l» \ ) , I lie 
principal case relied oi i b y lJ I a i n f i l l ,; h e r i* i II , I ln< 11II, I i l l ' 
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n 
claims against the corporate defendant were for rescission of two 
instruments which he had been induced to sign by reason of the 
fraudulent representations of the individual defendant. The 
plaintiff also sought to recover "damages" from the individual 
defendant in an amount equal to the consideration paid by him in 
the transaction. Meredith, at 943. The issue in the case was 
whether the plaintiff was foreclosed from recovering "damages" 
from the individual defendant under the doctrine of election of 
remedies where his claim against the corporate defendant was for 
rescission. 
The court in Meredith acknowledged that the plaintiff cannot 
have two satisfactions for the same injury. The court noted, 
however, that the corporate defendant had been out of business 
for some time and had no assets, and thus could not restore the 
plaintiff to the position he had been in prior to the 
transaction. In view of the plaintiff's inability to obtain 
satisfaction from the corporate defendant for his injury, the 
court ruled, it would not be a violation of the doctrine of 
election of remedies for the plaintiff to recover "damages" from 
the individual defendant. As stated by the court: 
The rescission of a contract for fraud does not 
prevent a recovery of damages from one who participated 
in the fraud but was not a party to the contract. At 
least such is the rule where the complaining party has 
"failed to obtain satisfaction" "either by a 
restoration or recovery of the consideration or 
otherwise." 24 Am.Jur. p. 39, §211. 
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[ T ] he p.1 a i nt i f f f s r e s c i s s i on or a11empt r -J * esc i nc _..-
c o n t r a c t on account of the fraud does not d e f e a t h i s 
r i g h t t o recover damages from a t h i r d p a r t y so long as 
he has f a i l e d t o o b t a i n s a t i s f a c t i o n for h i s i n j u r y , 
e i t h e r by a r e s t o r a t i o n o r r e c o v e r y o f t h e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n y or o t h e r w i s e . 
Meredi th , "?* ~, r ' -.- :" (emphasis added) . 
1
 P P ' J u x o r a a o ^ : ••: • ' r ^"-Li!-_i'_ a i a I1UL 
juik * . .gainst- t-hp . ; , : . . . *. \,i\\- * * damage? h . « ^ 
I:he 'Lener i* : * r\* Uaiua rur ><d^f * * e p l a n v * : 
, i I I< • * - . * 
ai 1 amount s u f f i c i e n t t o r e s t o r e th*- ;. :; •• i: • " ormer 
po s i t i o n . The co u r t s t a t edi 
It should be observed that a defrauded party may 
proceed against the principal and the agent, seeking 
rescission against the principal ai id damages against 
the agent who procured the execution of the contract. 
Such defrauded party can have one satisfaction, and 
fai1 i ng to obtain restitution either wholly or par11y 
from the principal, may recover from the agent such sum 
as will constitute restoration to status quo. Such 
will constitute the damages recoverable against the 
agent. 
Meredith, 384 P. 2d at: 94 6 (emphasis added), See also POJDOV 
Ladd Bi >3 the is , -l -Ill I1" V I J "> I  II ) 
In McAllister v. Charter First Mortgage, Inc.f 5 6? P.2d 539, 
• ;'."• * argument that the 
elect ic - i r remedies doctr.ne carted :i. ^ i i damages against 
the inducer i uie L U 
been obtained against the corporation, wh, n *.i:-> :>• pa* * : * 
contract. The Court went on to state that the measure ct iamages 
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against the fraudulent inducer is not the benefit of the bargain, 
but rather, "the extent to which the rescission decree has failed 
to restore the status quo (because of [the contracting party's] 
insolvency or otherwise)•" McAllister, 567 P.2d at 543 (emphasis 
added). 
Similarly, in Strout Realty, Inc. v. Burghoff, 718 S.W.2d 
469 (Ark. App. 1986), another case relied upon by Plaintiffs, the 
court ruled that the inducer of the fraud could properly be held 
liable for restitutionary damages, even though the plaintiffs had 
elected to rescind the contract in question. Id. at 471. 
The cases cited by Plaintiffs support the proposition that, 
in an action seeking to obtain a judgment of rescission against a 
corporation who was a party to a contract, based upon a claim of 
fraudulent inducement, the inducer of the fraud may be held 
liable for "damages" for whatever restitution the corporation is 
unable to pay. See, e.g. , Meredith v. Ramsdell, 384 P.2d 941, 
946 (Colo. 1963). Such damages do not include "benefit of the 
bargain" damages or other amounts intended to compensate the 
plaintiffs for the damages proximately caused by the defendant's 
conduct. 
The issue of whether Utah law will allow Plaintiffs to seek 
"damages" from Garner for any restitution obligation SLMM is 
required, but unable, to pay need not be determined by the Court. 
That issue is rendered moot by reason of Garner's agreement that 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/ A I certify that on this U " day of August, 1991f I served 
upon Plaintiffs a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Defendants1 Objection and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 
Notice of Election of Remediesf by causing the same to be hand-
delivered to the following: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
Clark W. Sessions 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
ALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
01 1G INTERN ft TION; INC. , et a l , 
Plaintiff, 
v s . 
11TH AVENUE CORPORATION, et al, 
Defendant , 
MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
CASE !T~ :-oo90-;;?3 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings submitted rules as 
follows: 
Defendants' obj ection to plaintiffs' Notice ?f Elect ion 
of Remedies is denied for the reasons set forth ; plainti £: :•' 
Trial Brief, points II and III. 
2. Defendants' first Motion in Limine is denied for the 
i: easons set forth in plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition thereto. 
, Defendants7 second Motion in Limine is denied for the 
reasons set forth in plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition. Title 
78-18-1 et.seq. U.C.A., effective May 1, 1989 is not applicable, 
the events i nvolved in the instant proceeding having occured 
prior to said effective date, and the statutory scheme having 
prospective application only. Expert opinions if pertinent and 
helpful to the trier of fact will be allowed if proper foundation 
i s laid. 
.-.:miffs' Motion ii i Limine is denied as to witness Mary 
D. Taylor for the reasons specified in defendants' memorandum in 
opposition. As to the balance of the listed fact witnesses the 
motion is taken under advisement. The testimony of expert 
witness Harry Arneson will be limited to that given in his 
deposition only. 
, Plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute Expert Witness is 
granted under certain terms and conditions relayed to counse. .n 
the telephone conference August 6, 1991. 
01 3 9 s 
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matter, 
Honor. 
THE COURT: I understand we have a verdict in this 
MR. CAMPBELL: That's what I understand, your 
(Whereupon, the jury entered the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: You may be seated. 
In this matter the record may show that all jurors 
are now present and in place, that the parties and counsel 
are present. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I'm Judge Sawaya taking Judge 
Frederick's place for the purpose of this part of the pro-
ceeding. It's the Court's understanding that you have a 
verdict. 
Have you reached a verdict in this matter? 
MS. THOMAS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And I assume — I don't know your name. 
MS. THOMAS: Linda Thomas. 
THE COURT: Are you forelady of this panel? 
MS. THOMAS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Would you hand the verdict forms to the 
Bailiff so that he can bring them to the Clerk, please? 
The Special Verdict and the Interrogatories all 
seem to be answered. I don't know what effect they'll have, 
but I will ask the Clerk to read the Special Verdict answers. 
04826 
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THE CLERK: Ong International (U.S.A,) Inc., a 
Nevada corporation; D & D Management, a Utah corporation; and 
David L. Alldredgey an individual, v. 11th Avenue Corpora-
tion , a Utah corporation, f/k/a Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum, 
Keith E. Garner, an individual. Special Verdict of the Jury, 
Case No. 900904288. 
We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled 
action, find the issues of fact and return our special 
verdict as follows: I. Claims of Ong International, U.S.A. 
Inc., and D & D Management against SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and 
Garner: 1. Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner 
commit fraud, as that term is defined in the Court's Instruc-
tions, against Ong International and D & D Management in the 
sale of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Purchase 
Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement 
dated February 28, 1989? 
Answer: Yes. 
2. Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner 
commit constructive fraud as defined in the Court's Instruc-
tions, against Ong International and D & D Management in the 
sale of Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Purchase 
Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement 
dated February 28,1989? 
Answer: No. 
Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner 
01827 
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negligently misrepresent, as that term is defined in the 
Court's Instructions, to Ong International and D & D Manage-
ment the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum properties and assets 
in the sale under the Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 
1988 and the Redemption Agreement dated February 28, 1989? 
Answer: Yes. 
If your answer is yes to any of the questions 1, 2 
or 3 above, then the Court, as part of the judgment entered 
on the Special Verdict, will order a rescission of the 
Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement, including 
releases in accordance with these instructions. 
II. Claims of Ong International against Keith E. 
Garner, individually: Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an 
individual, commit fraud, as that term is defined in the 
Court's Instructions, against Ong International in the sale 
of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Partnership 
Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement 
dated February 28,1989? 
Answer: Yes. 
Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual, 
commit constructive fraud, as that term is defined in the 
Court's Instructions, against Ong International in the sale 
of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Partnership 
Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement 
dated February 28, 1989? 
04828 
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Answer: No. 
Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual, 
negligently misrepresent, as that term is defined in the 
Court's Instructions, to Ong International the sale of the 
Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Partnership Agreement 
dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement dated 
February 28, 1989? 
Answer: Yes. 
III. Claims of Ong International for breach of one 
or more fiduciary duties: Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and 
Keith E. Garner breach a fiduciary duty as a partner to Ong 
International in the course of the performance of the 
Partnership Agreement between the date of the Partnership 
Agreement, May 13, 1988, and the date of the Redemption 
Agreement, February 28,1989? 
Answer: Yes. 
Did Keith E. Garner convert partnership assets to 
his own use or purposes during the term of the partnership 
between May 13, 1988 and February 28, 1989? 
Answer: No. 
If, under Section I or II above, you have answered 
yes to any of the questions 1, 2 or 3, then you should 
proceed to answer the questions under Section IV. If you 
have not so answered the questions under Sections I and II, 
then you should now proceed directly to Section V. 
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Section IV. Damages to Ong caused by fraud, 
constructive fraud or negligent misrepresentations of SLMM/ 
11th Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner, and as to Keith E. 
Garner, individually: If you have answered yes to any of the 
questions 1, 2 or 3 of Section I or II, then answer this 
question. 
Fraud damages as to Keith E. Garner: What was the 
difference between the fair market value of the corporate 
assets of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum as represented at 
the time of the Partnership and Redemption Agreements and the 
fair market value of said corporate assets in the condition 
it was actually in as of the same dates? 
$400,047 — no, $447,000. I'll just read the 
numbers. Four four seven comma zero three four. 
Consequential damages: What are the amount of 
consequential damages, as defined in the Court's Instruc-
tions, which Ong International has sustained as a result of 
the fraud, constructive fraud, or negligent misrepresentation 
by SLMM/11th Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner? 
$1,165,022. 
Answer the following question only if you have 
determined that SLMM/11th Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner, 
or Keith E. Garner, individually, committed fraud upon Ong 
International. 
C. Punitive damages: 1. Should SLMM/11th Avenue 
04830 
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Corp. and Keith E. Garner pay punitive damages to Ong Inter-
national in consequence of the fraudulent misconduct? 
Answer: Yes. 
a. If you have answered yes to this question, what 
is the amount of punitive damages that SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. 
and Keith E. Garner should pay to Ong International? 
$1,800,000. 
If you have answered yes to question 1 or 2 under 
Section III, then proceed to Section V. If you have answered 
no to question 1 of Section III, then proceed no further, 
sign your Special Verdict as instructed, and notify the 
Bailiff that you are ready to return to open court. 
V. Damages to Ong International for breach of 
fiduciary duty: 1. What are the damages which Ong Inter-
national has sustained as a consequence of the SLMM/llth 
Avenue Corp.'s breach of fiduciary duties in the course of 
the performance of the Partnership Agreement? 
Answer: $70,000. 
2. What are the damages sustained by Ong Inter-
national as a natural and direct consequence of the conver-
sion of assets by Keith E. Garner? 
Answer: $512,098. 
Dated this 26th day of August, 1991, Linda Thomas, 
Foreperson of the Jury. 
THE COURT: Gentlemen, do you have any questions 
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with regard to the verdict as it's been read by the Clerk? 
Mr. Campbell? 
MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, the Plaintiff doesn't 
have any questions at this time. 
THE COURT: Would you request that the jury be 
polled with regard to their verdict? 
MR. CAMPBELL: No, we don't, your Honor, but we 
have no objection of that being done. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. MANGUM: Yes, your Honor, Defendants do have a 
question, particularly with regard to the last answer read as 
it relates to question number 2 of Section III, and if we 
might have a bench conference on that matter. 
THE COURT: Section III, claims of Ong Inter-
national for breach of one or more fiduciary duties? Is that 
the one? 
MR. MANGUM: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Subsection or subquestion 2, did 
Keith E. Garner convert partnership assets to his own use or 
purposes during the term of the partnership — is that how it 
starts? 
MR. MANGUM: Yes. 
THE COURT: The answer to that was no and you have 
some question about that? 
MR. MANGUM: Well, the question I have, your 
XI: 7 
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Honor — 
MR. CAMPBELL: I think we ought to confer at the 
bench. 
MR. WESTON: If we could approach the bench, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out of 
the hearing of the jury and the Reporter.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, there's a bit of 
confusion with regard to the verdict that has been read, 
particularly with Section III and question number 2 to that 
particular question and interrogatory. Let me just read it 
to you and I'll inquire of — your name again? I'm sorry. 
MS. THOMAS: Linda Thomas. 
THE COURT: Linda Thomas. Thank you. 
Ms. Thomas, as the foreperson of the jury, I'm 
going to direct this question to you so that I don't need to 
go through everyone. Roman numeral III is entitled Claims of 
Ong International for breach of one or more fiduciary duties, 
and with particular attention to question number 2 under that 
heading, the question was, did Keith E. Garner convert part-
nership assets to his own use or purposes during the term of 
the partnership between May 13, 1988 and February 28, 1989? 
You have answered that no. Is that the answer to which you 
intended to — 
XI: 8 
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MS. THOMAS: Yes, it is. 
THE COURT: — reply? 
Subsequently you awarded damages for that particu-
lar breach and that's the inconsistency that we need to 
resolve. 
My question to you, did the jury unanimously intend 
to answer subparagraph 2 to paragraph Roman numeral III, did 
you intend to answer that no? 
MS. THOMAS: We did and we took that only as the 
actual transferring of property which is why we answered no. 
THE COURT: If you answered that no, then it is my 
understanding that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover 
damages for that breach. Do you understand that? 
MS. THOMAS: I do, I understand what you're saying. 
We did not take it into consideration as being total fiduci-
ary responsibilities. We only took it into consideration as 
being crypts. 
THE COURT: And yet you assessed damages for that 
breach. 
MS. THOMAS: Yes, we did. 
THE COURT: Did you understand that the Plaintiff 
cannot recover those damages even though you assessed them? 
MS. THOMAS: No, we did not. We figured he could, 
so we do have an error in there. Do you want us to go back 
in and discuss it? 
XI: 9 
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THE COURT: Would you like to go in and correct 
this error as you see it? 
MS. THOMAS: Yes, I do think that would be 
appropriate. 
THE COURT: Counsel, do you feel that would be the 
way to handle it? 
MR. CAMPBELL: We do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let me send you out again for the time 
that it will take you to correct the verdict and as you 
correct it, will you initial what you correct? 
MS. THOMAS: Yes, sir, I will. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: I don't think we need to recess. My 
expectation is that it won't take but a moment. 
MR. CAMPBELL: Right. 
(Whereupon, after a period of time, the jury 
entered the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: You may be seated. 
The record may again show that all jurors are now 
present and in place, parties and counsel are present, and 
Ms. Thomas, have you made the corrections on the verdict form 
that you intended to make? 
MS. THOMAS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that by majority vote? 
XI:10 
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1 MS. THOMAS: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: And unanimous vote of the members of 
3 the jury? 
4 MS. THOMAS: Yes, it was. 
5 THE COURT: You can bring that up. 
6 Counsel, the verdict form has been amended by the 
7 members of the panel with regard to Roman numeral III, 
8 question number 2. The answer to that has been changed from 
9 no to yes, and I'll ask, Ms. Thomas, is that the amendment 
10 and the correction that you intended to make? 
11 MS. THOMAS: Yes, it was. 
12 THE COURT: Is that a correction based on the fact 
13 that you made a mistake in marking the answer no previously? 
14 MS. THOMAS: We did discuss it in full. 
15 Am I not answering your question? 
16 THE COURT: I'm not sure that you did. Try it 
17 again. 
18 MS. THOMAS: What was your question again? 
19 MR. CAMPBELL: It's hard to hear. 
20 THE COURT: Is it hard to hear? I'm so soft-spoken 
21 in my old age. 
22 Ms. Thomas, that answer now is yes. Is that the 
23 answer that you and the panel intended to give previously? 
24 MS. THOMAS: Yes, we believe it was. 
25 THE COURT: And based on further deliberation and 
XI:11 
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discussion in the jury room, you've determined that you had 
marked the wrong answer? Is that what happened? 
MS. THOMAS: Yes, that is correct. 
THE COURT: Now, you have marked the answer as yes 
and initialled it; is that correct? 
MS. THOMAS: Yes, sir, I did. 
THE COURT: Counsel, is that satisfying you? 
MR. CAMPBELL: Are there any other changes, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Are there any other changes? 
MS. THOMAS: No, sir, there are not. 
THE COURT: All right, the damage portion in Roman 
numeral V indicating the damages for that breach are 
$512,098. Is that to remain unchanged? 
MS. THOMAS: Yes, sir, that's correct. 
THE COURT: All right, now, Counsel, do you want 
the jury polled with regard to any of these answers? 
MR. MANGUM: Yes, your Honor, counsel for Defend-
ants would as to all answers. 
THE COURT: Do you want them polled on each 
question? 
MR. WESTON: Yes, your Honor, we do with regard to 
the affirmative answers. 
THE COURT: A simple way of doing that is just to 
read each question and ask whether there were any members of 
XI :1 
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CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400 
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Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
fllU^bga. 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) 
INC., a Nevada corporation; 
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah 
corporation; and DAVID L. 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a 
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; 
KEITH E. GARNER, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF RESCISSION ON 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
OF THE JURY 
Civil No. 900904288 CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
the merits of plaintiffs' claims against the defendants before the 
Court, the HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, District Judge presid-
ing, on Thursday, August 8, 1991, the plaintiffs being represented 
by their counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Clark W. Sessions of 
Campbell Maack & Sessions of Salt Lake City, and the defendants 
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being represented by their attorneys, Arthur H. Nielsen, Gary A. 
Weston and John K. Mangum of Nielsen & Senior of Salt Lake City. 
The Court proceeded to impanel a jury of eight (8) men 
and women, along with two alternates, to try the issues of fact 
under plaintiffs1 complaint, opening statements of counsel were 
thereupon made and evidence in. the form of sworn testimony, 
exhibits and stipulations were submitted by the parties, respec-
tively, and received by the Court on the days of August 8, 9, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1991. On Friday, August 23, 1991, 
the Court instructed the Jury as to the law to be applied to the 
facts and closing summations were thereafter made by counsel 
whereupon at the approximate hour of 4:30 p.m. on said date, one 
juror having been dismissed by stipulation and the first alternate 
having been seated with the second alternate dismissed, the case 
was submitted to and the Jury retired under the charge of a sworn 
officer to deliberate on the issues under the Special Verdict Of 
The Jury. 
After due deliberation, the Jury returned into open 
Court its Special Verdict on Monday, August 26, 1991, as follows: 
SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE JURY 
"We the Jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled 
action find the issues of fact and return our special 
verdict as follows: 
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CLAIMS OF ONG INTERNATIONAL, (U.S.A.), INC. AND D&D 
MANAGEMENT AGAINST SLMM/11TH AVENUE CORP. AND GARNER: 
1. Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner 
commit fraud, as that term is defined in the 
Court's Instructions, against Ong International 
and D&D Management in the sale of the Salt Lake 
Memorial Mausoleum under the Purchase Agreement 
dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement 
dated February 28, 1989? 
Yes X 
No 
2. Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner 
commit constructive fraud as defined in the 
Court's Instructions, against Ong International 
and D&D Management in the sale of the Salt Lake 
Memorial Mausoleum under the Purchase Agreement 
dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement 
dated February 28, 1989? 
Yes 
No X 
3. Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner 
negligently misrepresent, as that term is 
defined in the Court's Instructions, to Ong 
International and D&D Management the Salt Lake 
Memorial Mausoleum properties and assets in the 
sale under the Partnership Agreement dated May 
13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement dated 
February 28, 1989? 
Yes X 
No 
If your answer is "Yes" to any of the questions 1, 2, or 
3 above, then the Court, as part of the judgment entered 
on the Special Verdict, will order a rescission of the 
Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement, 
including releases in accordance with these Instruc-
tions. 
3 
n i c\ -^  
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II. CLAIMS OF ONG INTERNATIONAL AGAINST KEITH E. GARNER, 
INDIVIDUALLY; 
1. Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual, 
commit fraud, as that term is defined in the 
Court's Instructions, against Ong International in 
the sale of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under 
the Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and 
the Redemption Agreement dated February 28, 1989? 
Yes X 
No 
2. Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual, 
commit constructive fraud, as that term is defined 
in the Court's Instructions, against Ong Interna-
tional in the sale of the Salt Lake Memorial Mauso-
leum under the Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 




3. Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual, 
negligently misrepresent, as that term is defined 
in the Court's Instructions, to Ong International 
the sale of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under 
the Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and 
the Redemption Agreement dated February 28, 1989? 
Yes X 
No 
III. CLAIMS OF ONG INTERNATIONAL FOR BREACH OF ONE OR MORE 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES: 
1. Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner 
breach a fiduciary duty as a partner to Ong Inter-
national in the course of the performance of the 
Partnership Agreement between the date of the 
Partnership Agreement, May 13, 1988 and the date of 
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2. Did Keith E. Garner convert partnership assets to 
his own use or purposes during the term of the 




If, under Section 1 or II above, you have answered "Yes" 
to any of the questions 1, 2 or 3, then you should 
proceed to answer the questions under Section IV. If 
you have not so answered the questions under Sections I 
and II, then you should now proceed directly to Section 
V. 
DAMAGES TO ONG CAUSED BY FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD OR 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS OF SLMM/ 11TH AVENUE CORP, 
AND KEITH E. GARNER, AND AS TO KEITH E. GARNER, INDIVID-
UALLY; 
If you have answered "Yes" to any of the questions 1, 2 
or 3 of Section I or II, then answer this question. 
A. Fraud Damages as to Keith E. Garner: 
1. What was the difference between the fair 
market value of the corporate assets of the 
Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum as represented 
at the time of the Partnership and Redemp-
tion Agreements and the fair market value 
of said corporate assets in the condition 
it was actually in as of the same dates? 
$447,034 
B. Consequential Damages: 
1. What are the amount of consequential damag-
es, as defined in the Court's Instructions, 
which Ong International has sustained as a 
result of the fraud, constructive fraud, or 
negligent misrepresentation by SLMM/llth 
Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner. 
$1,165,022 
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Answer the following question only if you have deter-
mined that SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner, 
or Keith E. Garner, individually, committed fraud upon 
Ong International. 
C. Punitive Damages: 
1. Should SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. 
Garner pay punitive damages to Ong Interna-




a. If you have answered "Yes" to this 
question, what is the amount of 
punitive damages that SLMM/llth 
Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner 
should pay to Ong International? 
$1,800,000 
If you have answered "Yes" to question 1 or 2 under 
Section III, then proceed to Section V. If you have 
answered "No" to question 1 of Section III, then proceed 
no further, sign your Special Verdict as instructed, and 
notify the Bailiff that you are ready to return to open 
Court. 
DAMAGES TO ONG INTERNATIONAL FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY; 
1. What are the damages which Ong International 
has sustained as a consequence of the SLMM/llth 
Avenue Corp.fs breach of fiduciary duty[ies] in 
the course of the performance of the Partner-
ship Agreement? 
$70,000 
2. What are the damages sustained by Ong Interna-
tional as a natural and direct consequence of 
the conversion of assets by Keith E. Garner? 
$512,098 
DATED this 26th day of August, 1991. 
S/ Linda Thomas 
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11 At the request of the defendants, the Court polled the 
| Jury as to their answers to the Special Verdict and determined 
|| that each of the questions were answered by unanimous vote of the 
i Jury and upon further inquiry of counsel having determined that 
ij all questions under the Special Verdict were answered, the Court 
i; received the Special Verdict, discharged the Jury from service and 
ordered that the Special Verdict be filed with the Clerk. 
And the Court, upon review of the Jury's Special 
ii 
: I 
i| Verdict, having concluded that several of the questions thereunder 
, were submitted based upon alternative theories of recovery and 
i that in light of the Jury's Special Verdict on several of the 
j| issues, recovery on other alternative issues will not be further 
|i pursued by plaintiffs or granted by the Court; and the Court 
1 
j having now considered all and singular the law appertaining in the 
•j matter and having concluded that a decree of rescission and damage 
Ij judgment should be accordingly entered upon the Special Verdict of 
;j the Jury, 
i | NOW THEREFORE, upon motion of plaintiffs, good cause appearing, 
i 
11 IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
i ! 
!! ii 
Ij I. COUNT II - RESCISSION AND ANCILLARY DAMAGES AND RELIEF 
jj PREDICATED ON FRAUD • 
|j 1. Under Count II of plaintiff's Complaint against 11th 
i 
|j Avenue Corporation and Keith E. Garner for fraudulent 
misrepresentations against both defendants as determined 
by the Jury in its Special Verdict in the sale of inter-
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ests in the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the 
Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988, and the Redemp-
tion Agreement dated February 28, 1989, said Agreements in 
their entireties as to all parties, along with all 
individual Releases incident thereto, BE AND THE SAME ARE 
HEREBY RESCINDED, SET ASIDE AND DECLARED VOID AB INITIO, 
AND OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. 
As an inherent part of said Rescission, 11th Avenue 
Corporation and Keith E. Garner jointly and severally be 
and they are hereby ORDERED to pay over and remit to Ong 
International, Inc., within twenty-four (24) hours of the 
entry hereof, the sum of One Million Two Hundred Forty 
Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Dollars ($1,240,220.00), paid 
by Ong International, Inc. to purchase the Salt Lake 
Memorial Mausoleum Partnership under the Partnership and 
Redemption Agreements. Simultaneously, Ong International 
and D&D Management be and they are hereby ORDERED to set 
over and convey to 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. 
Garner all right, title and interests previously purchased 
in and to the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum Partnership 
inclusive of the four (4) Skyway Heights lots and all 
assets and liabilities of the Salt Lake Memorial Mauso-
leum. 
To the end of effectuating this Order, in the event 
that 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. Garner fail to 
8 
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pay over and remit said sum at the time of transfer and 
conveyance set out above of the Mausoleum Partnership and 
properties, in addition to all other remedies available to 
Ong International, it shall have JUDGMENT against 11th 
Avenue and Keith E. Garner jointly and severally as of the 
date of transfer and conveyance for the sum Ordered, 
namely One Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Two Hundred 
Twenty Dollars ($1,240,220.00), together with interest 
thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 
and after the date of entry until the total of such sum is 
paid and satisfied as by law provided, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all necessary documents to 
forthwith effect the payment to Ong International and the 
transfer hereunder to 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. 
Garner shall be forthwith executed by the respective 
parties; 
2. For further relief under Count II and pursuant to the 
Special Verdict of the Jury, JUDGMENT BE AND THE SAME IS 
HEREBY ENTERED in favor of Ong International, Inc. and 
against 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. Garner, 
jointly and severally, for consequential damages as a 
result of the fraud in the sum of One Million One Hundred 
Sixty-Five Thousand Twenty-Two Dollars ($1,165,022.00), 
together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annum from and after the date of entry 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
until the total of such sum is paid and satisfied as by 
law provided; 
Under Count II and Paragraph 4 of Ong International's 
Prayer of the Complaint and pursuant to the Special 
Verdict of the Jury, JUDGMENT BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY 
ENTERED against 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. 
Garner, jointly and severally, for punitive damages as a 
result of the fraud in the sum of One Million Eight 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,800,000.00), together with 
interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after the date of entry until the total of 
such sum is paid and satisfied as by law provided. 
COUNT VI - ANCILLARY RELIEF OF INDEMNIFICATION 
Under Count VI and as an ancillary aspect of the relief 
under Count II of plaintiffs1 Complaint, 11th Avenue 
Corporation, Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum Partnership and 
Keith E. Garner jointly and severally be and the same are 
HEREBY ORDERED TO INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS Ong Interna-
tional, Inc., D&D Management and David L. Alldredge from 
and against any and all claims, demands, liabilities, 
losses, and damages of third parties against the Salt Lake 
Memorial Mausoleum Partnership, its partners or David L. 
Alldredge, which may have arisen or developed before or 
during the Partnership up to the date of reconveyance to 
11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. Garner of the 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Partnership interests pursuant to Paragraph I hereof, and 
which are hereafter made regarding the sale or marketing 
of wooden crypts or other conduct determined as fraudulent 
by the Jury under its Special Verdict incident to the 
Partnership or Redemption Agreements or the operation of 
the Partnership between May 13, 1988 and February 28, 
1989. 
III. COUNT III - RESCISSION AND DAMAGES PREDICATED ON NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION. 
Under Count III of plaintiffs' Complaint, the Jury deter-
mined in its Special Verdict that 11th Avenue Corporation 
and Keith E. Garner both as the alter ego of the Corpora-
tion and individually, made negligent misrepresentations 
in the Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the 
Redemption Agreement dated February 28, 1989. The Court 
has determined that the relief of Rescission and compensa-
tory damages under Count III is the same and duplicative 
of that under Count II of plaintiffs1 Complaint and that 
as a matter of law, no additional compensable damages may 
be recovered by Ong International, Inc. against 11th 
Avenue Corporation or Keith E. Garner, either individually 
or as the alter ego of 11th Avenue Corporation. Accord-
ingly, JUDGMENT BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor 
of Ong International, Inc. and against 11th Avenue 
Corporation and Keith E. Garner, jointly and severally for 
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negligent misrepresentation with no additional relief or 
compensable damages beyond that set forth in this Decree 
and Judgment under Paragraph I, subparagraphs 1 and 2 
immediately preceding. 
IV. COUNT II - FRAUD AGAINST GARNER, INDIVIDUALLY. 
Under Count II of plaintiffs' Complaint, pursuant to the 
Jury's Special Verdict finding fraud as to Keith E. 
Garner, individually, JUDGMENT BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY 
ENTERED in favor of Ong International and against Keith E. 
Garner, an individual, in the sum and amount of Four 
Hundred Forty-Seven Thousand Thirty-Four Dollars 
($447,034.00) and punitive damages of One Million Eight 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,800,000.00); Provided 
However, that this Paragraph IV shall be and is enforce-
able only to the extent that it ensures recovery by Ong 
International of the restitutional damages (purchase price 
and consequential damages) awarded to it under Paragraph 
I of this Decree and Judgment. It shall not be enforced 
in addition to or independently of the consequential 
damages and punitive damages under Paragraph I. 
V. COUNT I - CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD. 
Under Count I of plaintiffs' Complaint, the Jury having 
found no constructive fraud under the Special Verdict as 
to 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. Garner or Keith E. 
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Garner, individually, said Count be and the same is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
VI. COUNTS IV AND V - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND CONVERSION. 
Under the breach of fiduciary duty and conversion allega-
tions of Counts IV and V of plaintiffs1 Complaint, even 
though the Jury found under its Special Verdict in favor 
of Ong International and against 11th Avenue Corporation 
and Keith E. Garner on both Counts, because of the 
potential inconsistencies of recovery under said Counts 
with Rescission and consequential damages under Paragraph 
I of this Decree and Judgment, Ong International has moved 
to dismiss voluntarily said Counts IV and V and according-
ly, said Counts be and the same are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
VII. CERTAIN CLAIMS OF DAVID L. ALLDREDGE AND D&D MANAGEMENT, 
The claims of the plaintiffs David L. Alldredge and D&D 
Management, except for their claims for rescission and 
indemnification, be and the same are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
VIII. ATTORNEYS FEES. 
The claim of the plaintiff Ong International, Inc. for 
attorneys fees was bifurcated pursuant to the parties' 
pretrial stipulation for separate hearing and determi-
nation following the verdict of the Jury. In light of the 
rescission relief and accompanying damages entered in this 
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IX, 
Decree and Judgment and pursuant to stipulation of the 
parties, the Court concluded that the recovery of attor-
neys fees by the prevailing party is unavailable under 
controlling law. Accordingly, the claims of all parties 
to recovery of attorneys fees are dismissed with preju-
dice, each of the parties to pay and discharge their own 
attorneys fees. 
COSTS AND EXPENSES. 
Plaintiffs are awarded their costs and expenses of suit in 
the matter. 
DATED this J£ ii day of September, 1991. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
I CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
ROBERT S. CI 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
GARY A. WESTON 
JOHN K. MANGUM 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAI/ DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 017 UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) 
INC., a Nevada corporation; 
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah 
corporation; and DAVID L. 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, fka SALT LAKE 
MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; AND KEITH 
E. GARNER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 900904288 
The defendants having filed their Notice to Submit for 
Decision in the instant proceeding related to their Motions for 
Judgment N.O.V., New Trial or Remittitur of Punitive Damage 
Award, and for Stay of Execution (filed September 26, 1991), 
being herewith fully advised in the premises, now therefore the 
Court rules as follows: 
1. Defendants' conditional request for hearing is 
denied• The Memoranda sufficiently set forth the respective 
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ONG INT. V. 11TH AVENUE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
positions of the parties. Oral argument accordingly is not 
deemed necessary. 
2. Defendants' Motion for Judgment N.O.V. is denied for 
the reasons set forth in plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition 
thereto. 
3. Defendants' Motion for New Trial or Remittitur of 
Punitive Damage Award is denied for the reasons specified in 
plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition thereto. 
4. Defendant's Motion for Stay of Execution filed 
September 26, 1991 is denied for the reasons set forth in 
plaintiff's Memoranda in opposition thereto. 
5. Defendants' requests for new trial or remittitur are 
in part founded on Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) 
(insufficiency of the evidence) and Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 59(a)(5) (excessive damages under influence of 
passion or prejudice) . This Court is of the view that the 
award of punitive damages was warranted by the evidence which 
was sufficient to support a lawful jury finding of defendant 
Garner's requisite mental state for the reasons delineated in 
plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' Motion. 
Moreover, the amount of punitives awarded, $1,800,000.00, when 
compared to the actual damages resultant from defendant 
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ONG INT. V. 11TH AVENUE PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Garner's conduct, $1,165,022.00 consequential, and 
$1,240,220.00 for rescission (which is an award necessitated by 
Garner's fraud), for a total of $2,405,242, the ratio is 
approximately 1:1-1/2. There is a reasonable and rational 
relationship of punitives to actual damages. This ratio range 
falls within the rationale of Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (June 28, 1991), thus 
eliminating the necessity of this Court to give a detailed 
explanation for its decision in affirming the award. However, 
this Court will articulate its views with regard to the 
so-called "seven factors11 as follows: 
A. Relative wealth of the defendant: Garner acknowledged 
at trial that he is a multi-millionaire, cf. , Exhibits 91 & 
317. Certain of Garner's assets were misrepresented at trial 
which misrepresentation was established by cross-examination. 
Garner testified on direct examination that his wife was 
awarded the LaJolla, California residence in their 1982 
divorce. When confronted with the original divorce file 
showing Garner was awarded the property, his original statement 
was retracted. 
B. Nature of alleged misconduct: The defendants' 
misconduct was fraudulent concealment and/or affirmative 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ONG INT. V. 11TH AVENUE PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
misrepresentation of the classical type. He falsely 
represented the plywood crypts as concrete, for which Ong paid 
$1,240,220.00. After the misrepresentation came to light, the 
crypts were expertly appraised as worthless property having a 
negative value. 
C Facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct: 
The facts and circumstances surrounding the fraud show that 
over a period of three to four years, Garner misrepresented the 
nature of the plywood crypts to everyone necessary to advance 
his fraud, including customers, insurance agents, building 
inspectors, his own staff and his partners. He believed he 
could sell the mausoleum and escape the consequences of his 
fraud through the general release of claims. Garner has shown 
no contrition for his acts; on the contrary, he persists in 
arguing that he cannot understand the dispute because wooden 
crypts ought to be good enough for anyone. 
D. Effect on the lives of plaintiffs and others: The 
uncompensated loss the Garner defendants have caused to Ong 
through the time, money and resources devoted by Ong to this 
case is tremendous. But even as egregious, is the effect on 
the lives of the hundreds of crypt owners who believed they had 
purchased cement rather than plywood crypts for themselves and 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
ONG INT. V. 11TH AVENUE PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
loved ones. This case presents a serious fraud on the public 
as well as Ong. Moreover the influence peddling aspects of the 
case show Garner's continued willingness to traffic in and play 
upon people's trust and confidence in their religious leaders 
and in his religious stature. 
E. Probability of future recurrence: It is impossible to 
tell what Garner defendants may do with the crypts after they 
retake possession of them. It is supposed they will either 
attempt to fill the crypts with those who seem to have no 
objection, or bring the crypts up to concrete standard. The 
punitive damage award will likely deter Garner from further 
fraud in connection with the mausoleum and might even silence 
the references to the L.D.S. Church in future sales pitches. 
Furthermore, the well-established basis for punitive damages is 
punishment as well as deterrence. Synergetics v. Marathon, 701 
P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), at 1112. 
F. Relationship of the parties: The relationship of the 
parties was, as the jury found, that of general partners 
invoking a fiduciary relationship that requires dealing with 
the highest level of openness, trust and confidence. Garner's 
fraud was in part committed against people with whom he stood 
in the highest fiduciary relationship of trust. 
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G. Amount of actual damages: The actual damages 
resultant from Garner's misconduct amount to $2,405,242.00. 
($1,165,022.00 consequential, $1,240,220.00 rescission). When 
compared to the punitive damage award of $1,800,000.00, results 
in a ratio of approximately 1:1-1/2. The actual damages 
supports the punitive damages award. 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in 
plaintiff's opposing Memoranda, defendants' Motions for 
Judgment N.O.V., New Trial or Remittitur of Punitive Damage 
Award, and for Stay of Execution are denied. 
Defendant's Supplemental Motion Concerning Bond During 
Pendency of Post Judgment Motions and Any Appeal (filed October 
17, 1991) will be ruled on upon timely receipt of request for 
decision per Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration. 
Counsel for plaintiff's to prepare an appropriate Order. 
Dated this November, 1991. 
DERICK 
0/JRT JUDGE 
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ONG INT. V. 11TH AVE. PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this _day of November, 1991: 
Robert S. Campbell 
Clark W. Sessions 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Joann Shields 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
201 S. Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
John K. Mangum 
Attorneys for Defendant 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) 
INC, a Nevada corporation; 
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah 
corporation; and DAVID L. 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a 
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; 





Civil No. 900904288CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
pursuant to notice before this Court, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, District Judge presiding, on the 26th day of 
September, 1991 at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake 
City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Plaintiffs appeared 
through and were represented by their attorneys, Robert S. 
Campbell, Jr., Clark W. Sessions of Campbell Maack & Sessions and 
n 
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the Defendants appeared by and through Gary A. Weston and John K. 
Mangum of Nielsen & Senior. The Court heard and considered the 
Defendants' objections to the form of Judgment proposed by 
Plaintiffs including the arguments and statements of counsel and 
memoranda filed by the respective parties. 
The Court further heard and considered the Application of 
Plaintiffs for a Supplemental Judgment for costs and expenses 
incurred in the operation of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum for 
the period August through September, 1991, including the 
arguments and statements of counsel and an Affidavit of David M. 
Traveler, marked and received as Exhibit Supplemental P-l and 
being fully advised in the premises, now therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Ong International 
(U.S.A.) Inc.f a Nevada corporation be and the same shall have 
Judgment against 11th Avenue Corporation, a Utah Corporation 
f/k/a Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum and Keith E. Garner, an 
individual, jointly and severally, in the sum of $29,648.00 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from 
and after the date of entry until the total of such sum is paid 
and satisfied as by law provided. 
DATED this Qi^day of (V>k| 1991. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEF 
GARY A. WESTON 
JOHN K. MANGUM 
210409.SJG 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981) 
JOANN SHIELDS (4664) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) 
INC, a Nevada corporation; 
DSD MANAGEMENT, a Utah 
corporation; and DAVID L. 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a 
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; 






Civil No. 900904288CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Plaintiff Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc. (MOngM), by 
and through its counsel of record, submits this Verified Memorandum 
of Costs in the amount of $27,737.85 incurred in obtaining its 
$4,205,242.00 Judgment against the defendants Keith E. Garner and 
11th Avenue Corporation. 
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ITEMIZATION OF COSTS 
The costs Ong seeks to recover in this action are 
summarized as follows: 
1. Filing Fees $ 125.00 
2. Witness Fees $ 768.75 
3. Deposition Fees $11,588.60 
4. Travel for Depositions $ 2,079.44 
5. Photocopies $ 8,918.91 
6. Photograph Fees $ 1,692.72 
7. Exhibits $ 2,564.43 
Total $27,737.85 
Detail for each of the above-stated categories is attached hereto. 
DATED this^^^day of October 1991. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
ROBERT S. 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
Attorneys for Ong International 
(U.S.A.), Inc. 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN, being first duly sworn on oath,! 
deposes and states that: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of i 
Utah and am one of the attorneys retained by Plaintiffs in this i 
action. 
2. I have reviewed the accounting records maintained by; 
Campbell Maack & Sessions with respect to its representation of the j 
Plaintiffs in this action and, in particular, the records relating! 
to costs and expenses disbursed on behalf of Plaintiffs. : 
3. Pursuant to my review and to my knowledge, the items , 
i 
stated herein are current, and the costs and disbursements have; 
been necessarily incurred in this action. 
i 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN j 
I 




•&/*f / ^ s/+*!*Sf7t t^2A 
My. CommjLssJ.Qn_Expj.res: 
; -• •.•:. :~i'^ KAThLuE;.' f- L O G ; 
'1 • ; • - • > V Septs:r,;-. •:• : ; ; . 
< ' " • - , . ; ' ' - J l N . V i P C r - . . '" • : . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main Street, 
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said capacity and 
pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that on 
the^J^t^/ day of October 1991 I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Verified Memorandum of Costs to be hand-
delivered to the following: 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Gary A. Weston 
John K. Mangum 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
<JX>^ ^ ^ 7 ^ ^ ? ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FILING FEES 
DATE PAYEE AMOUNT 
7-20-90 Third District Court $ 125-00 
TOTAL $ 125.00 
t 
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WITNESS FEES 
DATE PAYEE 
8-23-90 Marion Hanks 
8-23-90 Arnold Fluckiger 
8-23-90 Robert Ord 
8-23-90 Keith Garner 
10-17-90 Roger Evans 
10-17-90 Kim Ekker 
10-17-90 Dennis Lucero 
10-17-90 Richard Ith 
11-15-90 David Brockbank 
11-19-90 Steve Nielsen 
2-25-91 Sherman F. Anderson 
3-18-91 Marion D. Hanks 
3-18-91 Robert Ord 
3-18-91 Arnold Fluckiger 
3-18-91 Keith Garner 
3-18-91 Susan Stewart 
3-18-91 Steve Neilsen 
3-18-91 Sandra Lenois 
3-25-91 Eugene Kimball 
4-2-91 Burtis Evans, M.D. 
4-2-91 Nielsen & Senior 
6-6-91 Alan Funk 
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7-26-91 James 0. Cummings 
7-26-91 Lynne Godfrey 
7-26-91 Carol Bennett 
7-26-91 Clemens B. Waltz 
7-26-91 Eugene Kimball 
7-26-91 Dennis Lucero 
7-26-91 Sandra Lenois 
7-26-91 Marion Hanks 
7-26-91 Arnold Fluckiger 
7-26-91 Steve Neilson 
7-26-91 Roger Evans 
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6-28-91 Merit Reporters 
7-01-91 Merit Reporters 
7-09-91 Merit Reporters 
7-11-91 Merit Reporters 
7-15-91 Merit Reporters 
7-17-91 Norman E. Mark 
7-17-91 Merit Reporters 
8-15-91 Merit Reporters 
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PHOTOGRAPH FEES 
DATE PAYEE AMOUNT 
12/07/90 Howells One-Hour Photo $ 94.83 
08/01/91 Howells Photo Service 677.34 
08/02/91 Howells Photography 920.55 
Total $1,692.72 
a 
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Arthur H. Nielsen (A2405) 
Gary A. Weston (3435) 
John K. Mangum (2072) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No. (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Defendants 
n - - i 
c 
.v^rH'Sl 
r J&-. £> 
,iOi 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) 
INC., a Nevada corporation; D&D 
MANAGEMENT, a Utah corporation; 
and DAVID L. ALLDREDGE, an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, f/k/a SALT LAKE 
MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; and KEITH 
E. GARNER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS TO TAX 
COSTS 
Civil No. 900904288CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants, by and through their undersigned counsel, 
respectfully submit the following Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of the Motion of Defendants of even date 
herewith for the court to tax the costs in this action. 
10840 
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1 1 -12-90 
11-15-90 
1 1 - 2 6 - 9 0 
I 
1 2 - 1 3 - 9 0 
1 2 - 1 9 - 9 0 
1 2 - 3 1 - 9 0 
PAYEE/DESCRIPTION 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Arnold FLuckiger 
Taken 9/24/90 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Robert Ord, Vol. 
Taken 10/1/90 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Robert Ord, Vol. 
Taken 10/17/90 
I I 
M e r i t R e p o r t e r s 
D e p o of M a r i o n D. H a n k s 
Taken 10/16/90 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of David Alldredge 
Taken 11/2/90 
Merit Reporters Trans . E x s . 
De p o of B r i a n ( K i m ) E k k e r 
T a k e n 1 1 / 8 / 9 0 - $208.05 + $0.40 
Depo of Roger Evans 
Taken 11/8/90 - $182.20 + $0.80 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Sandra Lenois 
Taken 11/11/90 - $346.70 + $4.60 
Depo of David Brockbank 
Taken 11/1/90 - $344.35 + $0.40 
Depo of Richard Ith 
Taken 11/16/90 - $273.85 + $0.80 
Depo of Dennis Lucero 
Taken 11/16/90 - $222.15 + $1.60 
Depo of Steven Nietson 
Taken 11/21/90 - $363.15 + 15.40 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Keith Garner, V. II 
Taken 12/5/90 
Associated Professional Report 
Depo of Keith Garner, Vol. I 
Taken 10/29/90 
Postage 
$ 2 . 5 0 







$ 325 . 50 
$ 344 . 05 
$ 319.20 
$ 132.85 
$ 226 . 50 
$ 396.45 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of David Alldredge, V . II 
$ 1 , 589. 50 
$ 242 . 15 
$ 551.10 
$ 210.50 
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Depo of Jeri Stevens, Vol. I 
Taken 1/8/91 
Depo of Jeri Stevens, Vol. II 
Taken 1/9/91 - $232.10 + $20.80 
Depo of Monty Stevens 
Taken 1/9/91 - $ 49.50 + 6.40 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Lynne Godfrey 
Taken 2/7/91 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Susan Stewart 
Taken 2/20/91 
Kathleen Monaghan 
Depo of James Milne 
Taken 2/13/91 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Sherman Anderson 
Taken 2/28/91 - $164.55 + 
Depo of Clem Waltz 
Taken 2/28/91 - 104.60 + $1.00 
Merit Reporters 




308 . 80 
255.20 









Depo of Ong Ka Thai 
Taken 3/14/91 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Gene Kimball 
Taken 3/27/91 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Sherman Anderson, V. II 
Taken 4/18/91 - $231 . 50 
Copies of Depos of William Lang 
Taken 4/15/91, 6/28/91, and 
7/1/91 - $423.00 
and Charles Foote Taken 4/18/91 
and 6/28/91 - $216.50 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Dell Jean Cook 
Taken 4/19/91 
$ 9 . 60 
2 . 40 
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Depo of Burtis Evans 
Taken 4/25/91 -
Copies of Depos of Cramer 
Stiff taken 4/23/91 -




Depo of Gerald Newton 
Taken 4/29/91 
Depo of David ALLdredge, V.IV 
Taken 5/1/91 
Merit Reporters 




Depo of Carol Bennett 
Taken 5/7/91 
Depo of James Cummings 
Taken 5/7/91 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Dennis Strong 
Taken 6/19/91 
Depo of Stanley Snarr 
Taken 6/20/91 
Depo of L. Reaveley 
Taken 6/25/91 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Robert 
Taken 6/26/91 
W iIc oxen 
Merit Reporters 
Depo of Alan Funk 
Taken 7/1/91 
Depo of Virgil Kovalenko 
Taken 7/3/91 
Depo of Brent Pack 
Taken 7/3/91 
Depo of Al Landvatter 
Taken 7/3/91 
Depo of Charles Foote, V 
Taken 6/28/91 




M e r i t R e p o r t e r s 
Depo of Cheryl 
Taken 7/1/91 











$303 . 30 






+ $ 1 . 4 0 
+ 2 . 2 0 
$ 1 . 9 5 
$ 1 . 9 5 
$ 471 .35 
$ 293 .00 
$ 2 . 00 
$ 2 . 8 0 
$ 177 .70 
$139 .00 
+ $ 3 . 0 0 
+ $ 8 . 0 0 + $ 3 . 9 0 $622 .15 
$166 .90 
+ $ 3 . 2 0 
+ $ 2 . 0 0 
+ $ 0 . 0 0 
+ $ 2 . 2 0 
+ $ 5 . 6 0 
+ $ 5 . 4 0 
$ 3 . 7 5 
$ 3 . 7 5 
$ 3 . 7 5 
$ 3 . 7 5 
$917 .20 
$ 6 0 . 1 0 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7-15-91 Merit Reporters 
Depo of Ed Andrus 
Taken 7/2/91 
7-17-91 Norman E. Mark 
Depo of Harry 
Taken 7/5/91 
Arneson 
7-17-91 Merit Reporters 
Depo of Maxine 
Taken 7/9/91 
Hanks 
8-15-91 Merit Reporters 
Depo of Grant Caldwell 
Taken 8/14/91 
8-26-91 Anna M. Bennett 
Transcript of Trial Proffer of 










$11, 588 . 60 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981) 
JOANN SHIELDS (4664) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) : 
INC, a Nevada corporation; : AMENDED 
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah : NOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS 
corporation; and DAVID L. : 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, : Civil No. 900904288CN 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a : 
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
KEITH E. GARNER, an : 
individual; : 
Defendants. : 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs' counsel, Robert S. 
Campbell, Jr. and Clark W. Sessions of Campbell Maack & Sessions, 
will be taking the depositions of Keith E. Garner, Arnold 
Fluckiger, Robert M. Ord, and-Marion D. Hanks at the offices of 
Campbell Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main Street, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101 on the following dates: 
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Name -Date and Time 
Keith E. Garner 
(individually and as 
president of 11th Ave, 
Corporation) 
Arnold Fluckiqer 
Robert M. Ord 
Marion D. Hanks 
October 18, 1990 
10:00 a.m. 
September 24, 1990 
10:00 a.m. 
October lf 1990 
10:00 a.m. 
October 16, 1990 
10:00 a.m. 
Said depositions will be before a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and will be upon oral interrogatories pursuant to Rule 
30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this ..''/% day of September, 1990. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
f\ / 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the for^ day of September, 1990, 
the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS was served on 
Defendants by mailing a true and correct copy thereof to: 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. 
John K. Mangum, Eaq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
210409b.PL2 
n o O O S 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981) 
JOANN SHIELDS (4664) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) 
INC, a Nevada corporation; 
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah 
corporation; and DAVID L. 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a 
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; 




Civil No. 900904288CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of September, 1990, 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO THE DEFENDANTS and 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS were 
served on Defendants by hand-delivering true and correct copies 
of the same to Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. and John K. Mangum, Esq., 
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Nielsen & Senior, Attorneys for Defendants, 60 East South Temple, 
#1100, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DATED this 10th day of September, 1990. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
A ( i / ,-
i i 
. '\/'/<„- f ,<~/.re/:ts: ^,1 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of September, 1990, a 
true and correct of the foregoing DISCOVERY CERTIFICATE was hand-
delivered to: 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT "Ew 
Schedule of Deposition Fees 
Claimed by Plaintiffs 
As Grouped by Defendants 
Reporter fee not attributable to this 
case. Fee for deposition of M. Norman 6-
26, mistakenly included on invoice 4526B 
dated July 3, 1991 $ 85.00 
Reporter fee for computer disc 
conversions to ZX format invoice dated 
May 7, 1991, from Merit Reporters (part 
of payment made by Plaintiffs on May 7, 
1991) $ 175.00 
Court reporter fee to Anna Bennett on 
August 26, 1991, for copy of Defendants' 
proffer regarding testimony of Dr. 
Herbert Schroeder $ 12.50 
Reporter fees for copies of deposition 
transcripts for depositions taken only at 
request of Defendants 
a. 1989 deposition oi Ong Ka Thai taken 
in a separate action, and transcribed in 
1991 at request of Defendants - expedited 
rate 363.00 
b. Deponents not called to testify at 
trial by either side (M. Stevens, C. 
Foote, C. Despain, and C. Bennett) 482.20 
c. Fact witnesses at trial called by 
Plaintiffs (D. Alldredge, Ong Ka Thai, J. 
Cummings, and J. Stevens) 1,210.50 
d. Experts called at trial by Plaintiffs 
(Newlon, Milne, Stiff, Lang and Caldwell) 936.55 
Total of Items a. through d. above 
$ 2,992.25 
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5. Reporter fees for depositions of 14 
people deposed by Plaintiffs but who 
never testified at trial and whose 
depositions were not used at trial (S. 
Anderson, E. Andrus, H. Arneson, D. 
Brockbank, D.J, Cook, K. Ekker, L. 
Godfrey, Maxine Hanks, R. Ith, E. 
Kimball, B. Pack, S. Snarr, D. Strong, 
and C. Waltz) $ 3,480.35 
6. Reporter fees for depositions of 8 people 
deposed by Plaintiffs, called to testify 
at trial only by Defendants 
a. Defendants' Experts (Schroeder, 
Reaveley, Wilcoxen, and Funk) 913.30 
b. Fact Witnesses (S. Stewart, B. Evans, 
A. Landvatter, and V. Kovalenko) 866.35 
Total of items a. and b. above $ 1,779.65 
7. Reporter fees for depositions of 8 people 
deposed by Plaintiffs and called to 
testify at trial by Plaintiffs 
a. Interviewed by Plaintiffs before 
deposition (R. Evans, S. Lenois, and S. 921.95 
Nielson) 
b. Depositions noticed before Plaintiffs 
served first set of interrogatories on 
Defendants (A. Fluckiger, R. Ord, K. 
Garner, and Marion Hanks) 1,914.85 
c. Remaining witness (D. Lucero) 227.05 
Total of items a. through c. above $ 3,063.85 
8. Grand Total of Items 1-7 above $11,588.60 
02302 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) 
INC, a Nevada corporation; 
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah 
corporation; and DAVID L. 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, f/k/a 
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; 





Civil No. 900904288CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The Motion of Defendants for Taxation by the Court of Costs 
came on regularly for determination on December 23, 1991. After 
considering the Motion, Plaintiffs1 Verified Memorandum of Costs, 
the memoranda of the parties filed in support and in opposition 
to the Motion, and being fully advised in the premises, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
1. Defendants1 motion for taxation of costs be and the same 
is hereby granted. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
2. Witness fees for the scheduled trial date in May, 1991, 
be and the same are hereby disallowed as costs of this action. 
3. Travel expenses for depositions, together with expenses 
for photocopies, photograph fees and exhibits be and the same are 
hereby disallowed as costs of this action. 
4. All other costs as prayed for in Plaintiffs1 Verified 
Memorandum of Costs (except the $85.00 erroneous deposition fee) 
be and the same are hereby allowed and taxed as costs of the 
action, detailed as follows: 
Filing Fees $ 125.00 
Witness Fees 631.75 
Deposition Fees 11,503.60 
TOTAL $12,260.35 
Pursuant to the foregoing, JUDGMENT be and the same is 
hereby awarded against 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. 
Garner, jointly and severally, and in favor of Ong International 
(U.S.A.), Inc. in the amount of Twelve Thousand Two Hundred Sixty 
Dollars and Thirty-Five Cents ($12,260.35). 
DATED this j/^day of JQ|\^  , 199^. 
BY THE COURT: 
/A r* A r\ c-
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
}\U**\ • (/isvdua&ofi 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
Attorneys for Ong International 
(U.S.A.), Inc. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
}\^L 
IUR H. NIELSEN^ 
A. WESTON 
JOHN K. MANGUM 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CHAPTER 18 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
Section Section 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages 78-18-2. Drug exception. 
awards — Section inapplicable 
to DUI cases — Division of 
award with state. 
78-18-1- Basis for punitive damages awards — Section in-
applicable to DUI cases — Division of award with 
state-
CD (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of 
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising 
out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily in-
toxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and 
drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44. 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regard-
ing shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or gen-
eral damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been 
paid to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section 
78-11-15 or 78-11-16. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible 
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of 
the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into 
the General Fund. 
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L. Applicability. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4 
1989, ch. 237, § 1; 1991, ch. 6, § 4. provides that the act applies to all claims for 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- punitive damages that arise on or after May 1, 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, made a stylistic 1989. 
change in Subsection (1Kb) and added Subsec- Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4 
tion (lXc). makes the act effective on May 1, 1989. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — 
Tort Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 269. 
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CHAPTER 237 
S. B. No. 24 
^ Passed February 21, 1989 
Approved March 14, 1989 
Effective May 1, 1989 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AMENDMENTS 
By Haven J. Barlow 
LeRay L. McAllister 
Lorin N. Pace 
Richard B. Tempest 
Arnold Christensen 
Stephen J. Rees 
Dix H. McMullin 
David H. Steele 
Lane Beattie 
Omar B. Bunnell 
Glade Nielsen 
Craig A. Peterson 
Alarik Myrin 
John P. Holmgren 
Dixie L. Leavitt 
Eldon A- Money 
Cary G. Peterson 
C. E. Peterson 
0 Boyd K. Storey 
AN ACT RELATING TO PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES; PROVIDING CERTAIN STANDARDS 
FOR AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
ENACTS: 
78-18-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
78-18-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Sect ion Enacted. 
Section 78-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
enacted to read: 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages a w a r d s 
— Sect ion inapplicable to DUI cases — Di-
vision of award with state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, 
punitive damages may be awarded only if compen-
satory or general damages are awarded and it is es-
tablished by clear and convincing evidence that the 
acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of 
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the 
rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and 
standards of conduct of Subsection (a) do not apply 
tojtny claim for punitive damages arising out of the 
tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while vol-
untarily intoxicated or under the influence of any 
jgug or combination of alcohol and drugs as prohib-
jtejTby Section 41-6-44T 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condi-
g n shall be admissible only after a finding of liabil-
jtyjbr punitive damages has been made. 
(3Hn any judgment where punitive damages are 
awarded and paid, 50% of the amount of the puni-
tive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after pay-
ment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the 
state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund. 
Sec t ion 2. Sect ion Enacted. 
Section 78-18-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
enacted to read: 
78-18-2 . Drug exception. 
(1) Punitive damages may not be awarded if a 
drug causing the claimants harm: (a) received pre-
market approval or licensure by the Federal Food 
and Drug Administration under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 301 et. 
seq. or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 201 et. seq.; 
(b) is generally recognized as safe and effective 
under conditions established by the Federal Food 
and Drug Administration and applicable regula-
tions, including packaging and labeling regulations. 
(2) This limitation on liability for punitive dam-
ages does not apply if it is shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the drug manufacturer know-
ingly withheld or misrepresented information re-
quired to be submitted to the Federal Food and Drug 
Administration under its regulations, which infor-
mation was material and relevant to the claimant's 
harm. 
Sec t ion 3. Severabil ity Clause. 
If any provision of this act, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of this act is given effect 
without the invalid provision or application. 
Sec t ion 4. Effective Date. 
This act takes effect on May 1,1989, and applies to 
all claims for punitive damages that arise on or after 
that date. 
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